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Abstract 
This work aims to explain why elasticity parameter analysis will assume importance in future 
scenarios related to a Demand Response context. It is only in the last years indeed that a 
strong correlation between an updated elasticity value and a balanced electric grid has been 
defined. A new definition of this parameter is needed since external factors as consumers’ 
habits and possibilities have evolved drastically during the last decade, but also because 
weather conditions strongly affect green energies productivity, which represent an 
increasing portion of the overall produced energy; at last, users’ location were not usually 
considered in the calculations. Past papers that dealt with Demand Response (DR) and users’ 
participation used in fact fixed values taken from literature: those values were defined basing 
on historic consumption data, which didn’t differentiate between weekdays and weekends; 
moreover, only standard classes of users (basing on different voltage level) were considered. 
For this reason, author’s goal is to provide new values based on more recent data, that can 
be used either from the Distribution Network Operator (DNO) and end-consumers in order 
to have a more precise value of the amount of power (and then money) exchanged.  
A way to extrapolate elasticity from remuneration-power plots is described in this report, 
and a numeric confirmation of its reliability will be proved using real data as comparison. 
Moreover, it will be described the economic impact of this tool if used to make estimations 
of power/money traded. 
A case of a consumer who is asked to switch electric contract will be also studied, taking 
into consideration economic benefits (both from his point of view and DNO’s) and technical 
constraints. Tariffs and consumption data of the Portuguese context will be used: it shouldn’t 
represent a constraint since the model itself can be applied to any user who can choose a 
double tariff contract and a triple one over a mono-tariff.  
Keywords 
Demand Response (DR), Distributed Generation (DG), Elasticity evaluation, Electric 
markets, Energy contracts 
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Riassunto esteso 
Questo lavoro è finalizzato allo studio dell’elasticità delle utenze elettriche inserite in un 
contesto in cui viene applicato il Demand Response (DR). Tale programma ha come 
obiettivo quello di mantenere la rete elettrica stabile, evitando congestioni e relativi picchi 
dei prezzi dell’energia. Poiché il DR richiede interazioni in tempo reale tra gli operatori di 
rete e le utenze finali, esso può essere applicato solamente in presenza di smart grids, dove 
le utenze sono provviste di contatori smart in grado di gestire flussi bidirezionali di potenza 
e di ricevere costantemente aggiornamenti sullo stato della rete. Il continuo aumento delle 
fonti rinnovabili nel panorama energetico ha incrementato da un lato la generazione di 
energia carbon-free ma dall’altro le criticità legate a queste fonti alternative: fra queste, la 
loro natura aleatoria che ne impedisce una precisa programmazione e pianificazione a lungo 
termine. Per questo motivo risulta sempre più determinante il dialogo fra rete e utenze: così 
facendo infatti, si è in grado di sfruttare al meglio i momenti di alta produzione e di diminuire 
la richiesta di energia qualora essa non fosse disponibile in grandi quantità. Ciò implica che 
la curva di domanda dell’energia segua quella di produzione, dettata sempre di più, come 
menzionato sopra, dalle fonti rinnovabili. Al fine di adattare la curva del carico a quella della 
produzione, occorre incentivare i consumatori a variare le loro abitudini per quanto concerne 
l’utilizzo dell’energia elettrica: in questo elaborato si è adottata, come incentivo, una 
remunerazione di tipo economico. Nel passato già si è usato questo tipo di incentivo per 
spostare i consumi verso ore con maggiore produzione, adottando le cosiddette “fasce 
orarie”: in questo studio si è voluto partire da questa base per creare un modello dove, oltre 
alle fasce orarie, entrano in gioco gli intervalli con alta produzione nei quali l’energia viene 
a costare meno (data la poca domanda e la grande offerta). Si è quindi supposto che a un 
utente venga proposto di passare da un contratto per la fornitura di energia elettrica di tipo 
mono-orario a uno di tipo bi/tri-orario in modo da avere più tariffe nell’arco della giornata 
in cui spostare i consumi di potenza; con un contratto di tipo bi-orario o tri-orario infatti, 
oltre ad essere l’utente finale a beneficiarne (in quanto si hanno più scaglioni di prezzo 
rispetto a un mono-orario che ne è privo), anche il gestore stesso della rete può trarne 
beneficio in quanto può localizzare nell’arco delle 24 ore il momento in cui conviene 
indirizzare i consumi degli utenti, garantendo così stabilità alla rete. La disponibilità di un 
utente ad anticipare o posticipare i suoi consumi in base a una ragionevole remunerazione 
definisce la sua elasticità, fattore che in ambito elettrico è stato definito a inizio anni ’80 ma 
che solo ora sta assumendo grande importanza. L’elasticità infatti garantisce una stima della 
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potenza che può essere ottenuta da una specifica tipologia di utenza (una piccola impresa, 
un’utenza domestica, un edificio scolastico…) qualora fosse necessario ridistribuire 
l’energia in rete verso carichi maggiori per brevi intervalli di tempo (senza ricorrere a sistemi 
di stoccaggio o acquisto di energia dall’estero). Inizialmente tale parametro non veniva 
sfruttato dagli operatori di rete in quanto non erano presenti utenze attive (cioè in grado di 
produrre energia a livello locale per autosostenersi o per venderla alla rete). L’avvento delle 
rinnovabili (e quindi delle utenze attive) e l’aumento dei consumi energetici hanno fatto 
sorgere la necessità di bilanciare i flussi di potenza in rete: uno dei mezzi disponibili più 
adatti e immediati da utilizzare è l’elasticità stessa. Poiché tale strumento non è mai stato 
sfruttato, i valori di elasticità definiti per le diverse classi di utenze sono relativi ai consumi 
di fine ‘900 e pertanto non sono adatti al contesto energetico attuale. In questo elaborato si 
è voluto pertanto partire dalla definizione di elasticità per poterla adattare al contesto attuale, 
aggiornando i valori per le diverse tipologie di utenza. Dopo aver presentato i vantaggi 
relativi a un valore sempre aggiornato dell’elasticità degli utenti, si è proposto sia un metodo 
in grado di ottenerla da dati più recenti, sia un modello in grado di stimarla. Il primo step 
consente di definire, seppur a posteriori, l’esatto valore che l’elasticità ha assunto nell’arco 
delle 24 ore precedenti (poiché sono noti i consumi e le tariffe in cui sono stati spostati): ciò 
permette di avere una stima piuttosto precisa di questo parametro adattabile a utenze simili 
dando così beneficio all’operatore di rete, ora in grado di stimare con più precisione i valori 
di potenza che circoleranno in rete. Il secondo step invece ha come risultato un modello in 
grado di prevedere con più precisione l’andamento dell’elasticità nell’arco delle 24 ore 
successive: l’evoluzione rispetto al punto precedente è data dal fatto che ora si sfruttano i 
dati storici solo per definire inizialmente i valori di elasticità; tali valori infatti vengono 
interpolati e la loro interpolazione consente di avere una legge adattabile a un'altra 
giornata/utenza senza dover ricorrere nuovamente ai dati storici. Poiché tale operazione 
richiede costi computazionali, si è fatto un confronto tra il primo e il secondo step calcolando 
gli errori introdotti i quali, in questo contesto, rappresentano un eccesso/difetto di potenza 
consumata e di conseguenza diversi valori di remunerazione, a scapito sia delle utenze finali 
che dei TSO (Transmission System Operator). Si è dimostrato che l’utilizzo del secondo 
metodo è nettamente migliore in quanto, oltre ai vantaggi già elencati, non comporta grandi 
costi computazionali e non introduce errori apprezzabili. Un altro motivo che ha spinto a 
dare una nuova definizione dell’elasticità è legato alla sua estrema variabilità dipendente dal 
giorno della settimana (feriale o festivo), dalla posizione dell’utenza (se è localizzata presso 
un nodo debole o forte del sistema elettrico) e dalle condizioni metereologiche che 
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determinano la produttività degli impianti green: tutti questi fattori in passato sono sempre 
stati trascurati quando si stimavano i valori di elasticità delle utenze. 
Lo studio è stato effettuato simulando degli scenari basati sui dati della rete portoghese: ciò 
non preclude la sua adattabilità ad altri sistemi elettrici, in quanto i modelli creati lavorano 
con qualsiasi dato di input e gli andamenti delle curve di carico sono simili in ogni Paese. 
Il lavoro è diviso in sei capitoli: i primi due capitoli servono a introdurre il lavoro definendo 
il contesto in cui è inserito e le motivazioni che hanno portato alla sua stesura; il terzo 
capitolo presenta il concetto di elasticità e come si è arrivati alla necessità di valori 
aggiornati; il quarto capitolo indica la struttura del lavoro di simulazione presentata nel 
capitolo successivo, in modo da avere una guida da seguire nel caso si volessero ripetere e 
migliorare le simulazioni svolte; il quinto capitolo è la simulazione, eseguita basandosi su 
dati reali e ottenuta ipotizzando scenari in cui poter applicare il DR. Infine, il sesto capitolo 
presenta le conclusioni di questo elaborato.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Elasticity of electric consumers has been assuming growing importance in the last times. Being 
defined as the will of a user to modify its power consumes (after a remuneration), it goes without 
saying that it can have strong impacts on future energy scenarios. Theoretically speaking, power 
production would be supposed to match constantly power consumption, giving benefits both to 
grid balance and price spikes. Elasticity is one parameter of the so-called Demand Response, a 
program that is supposed to manage in an optimal way power fluxes in the electric networks by 
rewarding end-users and, hypothetically, promoting green energy. In fact, climate change 
together with an increasing electricity demand by 80% within 2040 [1] makes DR with all its 
aspects a fundamental matter for the future of energy. Since DR doesn’t present any structural 
requirement nor constraint, it can be applied to every type of electric system. 
It is author’s desire that this document can be used and improved by other students and 
researchers who care about technological development, economic optimization and also about 
environmental issues. 
1.1 CONTEXT 
In the last decades electric systems have been involved into lot of changes required by the 
evolution of both consumers’ and producers’ technologies and economic constraints. 
Engineering fields as informatic, telecommunications, control systems and computations 
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(e.g. Internet of Things and Artificial Intelligence) have made available tools that can 
strongly benefit this sector [2], [3], i.e. the smart grids context. Moreover, most of electric 
markets have switched from monopolies to liberalized markets with the presence of more 
competitors, making consumers more active and influential also in the energy-buying process 
[4]. More powers to consumers, reliable and fast-communicating devices installed on grids and 
the increasing environmental issues, are all together reasons that make the actual world ready 
to host smart-grid technology.  
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
This work aims to study consumers’ impact on power production in a future scenario, in 
particular with a well-defined elasticity parameter for every type of user.  
In order to accomplish that goal, the following points have been examined: 
- Study of methods available in literature to establish elasticity values; 
- Study and implementation of different scenarios to evaluate effects of computed 
elasticities on remunerations; 
- Development of a method able to follow real-time demand in order to define real-time 
elasticity; 
- Adapt correlation methods to different types of consumers and evaluation of the 
economic impacts; 
- Simulation of a contract change for a generic user to study how to promote double/triple 
tariffs contracts. 
The reason that led the author to that choice is that currently elasticity parameters are the ones 
used more than 20 years ago: since users’ habits, needs and possibilities are changed (e.g. with 
the incrementing penetration of electric vehicles), these parameters need to be updated. Not 
only: a well-defined value, constantly updated, would allow to minimize exceeding production 
and price spikes (in some cases easily from one-half to two-thirds [5]) by keeping the grid 
constantly balanced. 
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1.3 CALENDARIZATION 
This work required about 7 months, from October 2018 to April 2019. While the first two 
months were used to gather information about the state of art of elasticity in the Demand 
Response context, the rest of the time was dedicated to develop scenarios and simulations.  
1.4 WORK ORGANIZATION 
After this introduction, four chapters are present and a final conclusion concludes this report. 
In the second chapter, an overview of electric systems and markets was done because Demand 
Response (DR) has a strong influence on them. In fact end-users’ consumptions habits have 
been acquiring importance since they determine the amount of power to be generated. As 
already mentioned, new habits and possibilities of electric consumers represent both means and 
challenges to the DNOs all over the world to manage power fluxes into the grid, keeping it 
balanced. 
Since power blocks are strictly connected to money exchanges, some markets structures are 
described briefly. They are supposed to complete the panorama of the DR/smart grids context. 
In the third chapter, DR has been discussed as a mean adopted in some countries and as a subject 
of study for researchers all over the world. In particular, in the same research unit this report 
was written1, researchers work on other aspects of DR such as clustering and aggregations: 
that’s why these arguments are briefly described here. Gathering information and data will 
represent a hard challenge for next generations, since high-tech devices are going to be always 
more essential to people’s lives and, in order to perform at best, they need to constantly 
give/receive data about everything. Models and algorithms that work in this field may also work 
in others, like the “big-data” and “artificial intelligence” one. The high feasibility of this 
argument is the reason why it has been selected and put into this report. 
In the following chapters data and results of author’s work are showed and discussed. The work 
can be divided in sections, all of them correlated by the same purpose: an optimization of the 
power-money system. Methods are explained step by step and the all equations used are fully 
described. Finally, a simulation of a possible scenario has been analyzed bringing to important 
conclusions and considerations, both from an engineering prospective and an economic one. 
 
1 GECAD - Research Group on Intelligent Engineering and Computing for Advanced 
Innovation and Development. 
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2 Related Literature 
In this chapter it is presented what has been found on literature about Demand Response and elasticity. 
If DR is a topic faced by lot of researchers2 and electric companies, giving lot of papers and books as 
a result, one the other hand elasticity (in DR context) has been discussed intensively only in the last 
years, therefore less documentation is available. In addition to these topics, an overview of how an 
electric system is constituted and how electricity market is divided is here presented, since it’s 
necessary to understand the context in which this work is placed. 
2.1 DEMAND RESPONSE 
As said in [6], DR programs are defined as alterations of load profiles according to incentives provided 
by network operator due to technical reasons or economic purposes. In a more detailed way, it can be 
described as a “tariff or program established to motivate changes in electric use by end-use customers 
in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to give incentive payments designed to 
induce lower electricity use at times of high market prices or when grid reliability is jeopardized” [7]. 
Despite DR is not a recent phenomenon (it has been decades that congestions have occurred during 
demand-peaks periods [6]), only in the last decade technological development has allowed to manage 
power fluxes in a smart way: in the past consumers were informed about high demand periods only by 
 
2 According to [46], publications increased exponentially, from some issues per year in the 1990’s to some thousands per 
year after 2010. 
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the different scheduled tariffs applied over the 24h. Nowadays instead it is possible to use users’ 
flexibility: this would be the way to employ both buildings and energetic resources more efficiently. 
According to data of the” Respond” project [8], “DR market is expected to grow to $9.7 billion by 
2023” with a capacity (GW) that will grow exponentially. Fig.2.1 shows how installed capacity is 
expected to grow in the macro-areas of the world3. Nowadays USA has the “most developed DR 
market in the world” where commercial and industrial customers cover most part of it in terms of 
“incentives, flexibility and savings” despite they participate only of 10% of it. 
Focusing on Europe, in 2014 the total DR resource capacity stood at 2 [GW] while a study conducted 
by Sia Partners in 2015 stated that the total DR potential in Europe amounts to 52.35 [GW], 42% of 
which coming from residential applications, 31% from industry and 27% from tertiary sector. 
Nowadays the most promising European countries for DR program technologies are Switzerland, 
France, Belgium, Finland, Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
3 Data taken from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), National Assessment and Action Plan on 
Demand Response. 2009. A National Assessment of Demand Response Potential. 
Figure 2-1: DR capacity trend for industrial and commercial customers [8]     
Figure 2-2: Power trend during the day and its optimization [3] 
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The most evident advantages of DR, as it is explained in the next paragraphs, are a decreasing pollution 
level, a more stable electric network with “peak shaving/valley filling” (Fig.2.24) and less price spikes 
occurrences. All these benefits are connected to the simple operation of moving consumptions into 
periods where “green” power is available, that is what DR aims to. 
As a proof of environmental benefits, it worth to be cited the “Earth Hour environmental campaign”5. 
S. Gyamfi and S. Krumdieck reported in [9] a notable initiative that took place in New Zealand. On 
March 29, 2008, residents of Christchurch responded to a well-advertised and council supported call 
to reduce electricity demand for one hour as a symbolic action. The campaign focused on turning off 
lights for one hour to “make a difference” and to “show concern for climate change”. The official 
measure of demand response between 7:00 pm and 8:00 pm was a 13% reduction. Demand Response 
(DR) then appears to be a useful tool both for end-consumers and network operators, since grids are 
always balanced minimizing all costs and taking care of environmental issues. 
Among European countries, Italy too is researching for technologies able to optimize DR once they 
are inserted into a smart grid context. For example Enel6, one of the most important Italian Network 
Operator (DNO), is investing in the ”Research&Development” sector to insert DR into electric market 
and electric system in the best way possible. Enel presents DR as a sequence of steps, that are quite 
the same as any other electric market: 
1. Network operator detect a congestion/fault in the electric system and informs the aggregator; 
2. The aggregator receives the balancing message and manages power with optimization algorithms; 
3. After the notification, consumers change his consumption/production; 
4. Network operator is informed about the succeeded balancing operation; 
5. Once the operation is ended, remuneration to clients occurs basing on contracted terms. 
  
 
4 Image taken from the USA Northwest Power and Conservation Council website 
https://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/energy-topics/demand-response 
5 https://www.earthhour.org/ 
6 https://www.enelx.com/it/it 
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Benefits of Demand Response 
DR can be seen as a tool that allows the DNO to better match real time demand and supply curves: 
this guarantees more efficiency to the system since fluctuations are kept small. Thanks to the 
correlation between active power and frequency, small fluctuations of (active) power bring little 
oscillations of frequency as well, representing a big benefit of DR. 
In the past a constant balance of the electric network was seen as a hard goal to get since problems as: 
• generation units forced outages; 
• transmission/distribution line outages; 
• sudden load changes; 
were able to change demand and production rapidly and unexpectedly [10]. In future scenarios instead, 
an optimal management of load and supply curves can be achieved thanks to DR, allowing to deal 
with problems like the ones mentioned above in the most efficient way, from a technical and an 
economic point of view. Participants indeed have the opportunity to help in reducing risk of outages 
[10] and operator will have more options and resources to maintain system reliability [11]. 
Demand Response seems to be an important solution to the increasing demand of power: it allows 
indeed to manage real time power avoiding increasing production or buying energy from other 
countries. Therefore advantages could be reached also in terms of environment pollution [12] and 
energy prices. 
Focusing on this last benefit, in [10] three actions that can be adopted from a customer are listed: 
• Reduce electricity usage during tariff-peak periods: this option involves a temporary loss 
of comfort (e.g. changing heathers/AC settings); 
• Move peak demand operations to off-peak periods: customers will bear no loss and will 
incur no cost; 
• On-site generation usage: if a consumer owns a source of power, his consumption trend may 
not follow high tariff schedule and experience no variations; however, for the DSO, demand 
will appear to be smaller. 
Programs such as DR can bring benefits to every participant of the electric market: producers would 
always generate power  (in fact lacks of demand are supposed to be constantly filled), end-consumers 
would not face anymore price-spikes and price volatility would be reduced in the spot market [10]. 
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Another important benefit is that DR ”reduces the ability of main market players to exercise power in 
the market” [5]: during California electricity crisis of 2000-2001, a reduction of only 5% of demand 
could have resulted in a 50% price reduction [13]. Nowadays a large amount of carbon plants works 
as reserves in order to provide security to the power supply. 
It happens especially in those power systems where a high penetration of non-predictable renewable 
generation is present [6]. Demand response represents an alternative solution to flexible generation 
resources, inter- connections between countries and electricity storage. An advantage of DR compared 
to these solutions is the lack of technological impediments since the required communications and 
monitoring technologies have been already developed [14]. 
DR brings a lot of benefits that can be enjoyed by every player of a smart grid based electric system 
(Fig.2.3). An example is given by a system with high wind generation where a big amount of reserve 
is required to keep the overall system balanced: instead of installing big capacity reserves, DR can 
curtail or shift loads both in geographical and time terms. In this way, power plants wouldn’t work at 
partial load (which is inefficient in terms of fuel consumption and it ruins the machines). It has also 
been demonstrated that by adjusting instantaneously lot of small loads a more effective ramping rate 
can be achieved compared to single larger generating plants [6]. Moreover, as acquiring and 
maintaining generating capacity represents a significant component of the total costs of a power system 
[16], DR represents a solution to reduce overall costs. Finally, it assumes importance the energetic 
independence that countries would have towards neighbouring states: an optimal utilization of the 
energy inside a region/country can avoid the need of buying it from other countries. 
Figure 2-3 : Representation of power fluxes in a DR context [15]  
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Application and programs 
DR can be implemented as a total curtailment of the load or a partial reduction of it. This latter case 
introduces the definition of elasticity, a parameter that is presented and discussed in chapter 3. Price 
Elasticity of demand is the measure of the responsiveness of the demand to its price [17]. In other 
words, it represents how much a consumer is willing to change his power absorption considering a 
remuneration variation. Its expression is given by the (2.1): 
𝑒 =
𝛥𝑄 𝑄⁄
𝛥𝑃 𝑃⁄
 
(2.1) 
where Q represents the initial demanded quantity, ∆Q its variation, P the initial price and ∆P its 
variation. Each consumer type may present its own elasticity value; moreover, it can change according 
to the day of the week or other factors as weather conditions, therefore a complete analysis is required. 
 
Costs of Demand Response 
New measurement tools and devices are needed in order to perform DR program in the best way. Their 
prices and their installation costs represent the first issue that is faced when operators/consumers 
decide to participate this program. For example, instruments’ requirements such as “smart thermostats, 
peak loads controls, energy management systems, on-site generation units” [10][18] are mandatory, 
but expensive. Besides these advanced metering systems, other types of expenses must be considered: 
• less comfort: users who join DR have to “sacrifice” their power absorption routine in order to 
be remunerated. This may result in a small change, as a different setting of a thermostat for a 
domestic user, or in a big one, as a complete rescheduling of an industrial process; 
• fuel for backup generating units: whenever a costumer decides to always have a second 
power source, costs of fuel and maintenance have to be taken into account; 
• upgrading billing system: power meters have to be upgraded in order read bi-directional 
power fluxes and receive constantly information about electricity price; 
• educational costs: investments are necessary to inform people about DR programs, how they 
work and why everyone should join them. In fact it may look only as a loss of comfort for the 
end-user and not as an opportunity to have discounts on bills and use energy in a green way. 
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Price-based DR and Incentive-based DR 
Methods of engaging customers in DR can be divided in two wide groups, namely “price-based DR” 
and “incentive-based DR” [7].  
Price-based DR is related to the changes in energy consumption by costumers in response to the 
variations in their purchase prices, since tariffs fluctuate following the real time cost of electricity [10]. 
The purpose of this kind of DR is to flatten demand curve by offering a high price peak periods and 
lower prices during off-peak periods. This group includes the following programs, that for now are all 
voluntary: 
• time of use (TOU); 
• critical-peak pricing (CPP); 
• real time pricing (RTP); 
Time of use includes different prices for usage during different spans of time, usually defined in a 
period of 24h. This rate follows the average cost of generating and distributing power during the day. 
It is supposed to incentivize ”night-valley filling” by shifting loads from day to night hours. The 
simplest TOU rate has 2-time blocks: peak and off-peak. 
Critical-peak pricing is slightly different from the TOU program because peak prices are defined 
according to specific conditions of the grid. It’s supposed to be for larger commercial and industrial 
consumers [6]. CPP prices are supposed to be used during grid congestions or high wholesale 
electricity prices for a limited number of days/hours per year [19]. 
Real time pricing defines prices of electricity for short periods of time, like 1 hour, reflecting the price 
changes in the electricity market. Customers are charged hourly with these fluctuating prices. 
Incentive-based DR includes programs that give the customers fixed or time varying incentives in 
addition to their electricity rates according to their consumption reduction. Some of these programs 
penalize customers that fail the contractual response when events are declared. The incentive-based 
group includes the following 6 programs [20]: 
• Direct Load Control: it considers a remote shut down or cycle of a customer’s electrical 
equipment (e.g. AC or water heaters) by the program operator. It’s addressed especially to 
residential or small commercial customers and usually is executed on a short notice. 
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• Interruptible/Curtailable Service: it is based on curtailments option integrated into retail tariffs 
that provide a rate discount or bill credit by agreeing to reduce load in critic moments for the 
grid. Generally this program is offered to larger industrial customers. 
• In Demand Bidding/Buyback programs costumers offer curtailment capacity bids. 
• Emergency DR can be expressed as a mix of Direct load control program and Curtailable 
Service. It’s used when reserve becomes insufficient. 
• In Capacity Market programs customers offer load curtailment as system capacity to replace 
conventional generation or delivery resources. 
• Ancillary Services Market is similar to Demand Bidding/Buyback program, but now offer is 
just made for ancillary services market.  
According to [10], the first two programs (DLC and I/C service) belong to the so-called “classical IB 
program”(IBP) since participating customers are given remuneration as bill credit or discount rate. 
The last 4 programs instead belong to the “marked-based IB program” since customers are rewarded 
with money for their performance according to their load reduction during critical conditions. 
Participants in classical IBP are entitled to receive incentive payments for their participation, while 
market-based IBP customers will receive payments according to their performance. 
Amongst price-based DR, in particular RTP, and incentive-based DR, the most promising one is RTP: 
a long-run study of RTP efficiency conducted in [21] demonstrated that efficiency gains from RTP are 
significant even where elasticity of demand is very low. Moreover, TOU tariff provides very small 
efficiency gains compared to RTP. 
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2.2 DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 
With “distributed generation” (DG) it is denoted the placement of medium-small electrical 
power generation units close to the end user or connected at a medium/low voltage level to an 
aggregator (whose role is presented in the next paragraph) that interfaces the grid. Most of the 
times DG is related to renewable energy sources: wind, water, sun, biomass (Fig.2.4). 
Distributed Generation growth is related to the increasing utilization of renewable energies by 
small users thanks to their affordable prices of installation. Moreover, DG presents many 
benefits, including: 
• Reducing of electricity bills (remuneration is proportional to energy contribution [8]); 
• Increasing the reliability of electric power; 
• Improving the payback of required generation systems; 
• Making power marketable to sell to utilities; 
• Generating green energy; 
Figure 2-4: Representation of Distributed Generation sources in the grid [22] 
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• Congestions relief; 
• Loss reduction; 
• Peak shaving; 
• Possibility to use co-generation on existing industrial plants; 
• Taking benefits from urban solid waste material; 
• Opportunity to generate power close to loads, having benefits in terms of power 
factor and voltage stability without installing new lines [9]; 
As described by Dilek7 and Broadwater8 in the book [23], an important feature of DG is that 
can be operated to control voltages [24] and power flows within the distribution system. They 
also state that more improvements in distribution system reliability and overall power system 
efficiency can be realized. In particular, for load growth with short-lived peaks that occur during 
extreme weather conditions, future DGs may provide lower-cost solutions than other 
approaches to system capacity upgrades. DG indeed provides means for increasing capacity of 
existing distribution facilities being an alternative to new substation addition and replacing 
existing equipment with larger ones. It has been demonstrated also that line losses can be 
reduced [25]. 
A DG installed at the distribution level releases capacity throughout the system, from 
transmission through distribution. Transmission system losses are eliminated, and distribution 
system losses are reduced. Some customer facilities have DGs that are installed for back-up 
power. These DGs are employed during grid-power outages or periods of high- cost grid power. 
They are operated for only a small fraction of time over the year. Moreover, back-up DGs are 
usually oversized, which means that they can provide more power than their facility loads need. 
These DGs can be equipped with a set of devices that will enable them to seamless interconnect 
to the grid and be dispatched if needed. The available capacity from such DGs can then be used 
for utility purposes.  
 
7Electrical Distribution Design, Inc. Blacksburg, Virginia  
8 Department of Electrical Engineering Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Blacksburg, Virginia 
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Distributed generation systems can operate connected to the grid or “standing-alone”. In the 
first case they rely on the electric grid to establish operating voltage and frequency while in the 
latter  generators can operate independently of electric grid parameters. This last case is also 
known as islanding. 
Whenever both of them need to connect to the grid, important conditions have to be assured as 
for example the same phase for voltage and current phasors. For this reason many types of 
protections are installed in these generators plants, for example: 
• Maximum/minimum current/voltage protections; 
• Maximum frequency range protection; 
• Maximum reactive power flow protection; 
• Phase shift of voltage phasor protection . . . 
Obviously a DG system can be asked to work on island during critical periods, even if it’s 
regularly connected to the grid; this lets the DSO focusing only on consumers without DG 
during high power demand periods. Besides all the safety constraints to consider when 
connecting to the grid, it must be said that DR can be divided in passive and active generation. 
Passive generation is relative to technologies that can’t control neither the generated power and 
the output one (as photo- voltaic and wind power): indeed they rely on the available amount of 
light and wind. For this reason passive generation cannot be dispatched, i.e. the output power 
can’t be regulated to better match the demand curve. Active generation instead presents control 
over input fuel and output power, such as fuel cells or micro-turbines. For this reason they can 
be used for dispatching. 
Insertion of DG into the existing electric grids implies an update of the network itself and its 
devices (mostly supposed to operate with only passive users) in order to have fast, economic 
and reliable instruments. Moreover, new laws able to deal with new power exchanges scenarios 
will be needed, as much as a trustworthy institution whose work will be protect users and 
operator guaranteeing fair remunerations and energy prices. Some studies focused on the 
technical issues of DG. A particular one concerns the relation between losses and power factor: 
in this case, a high pf (power factor) doesn’t imply low losses [26] and [27]. 
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It leads to the conclusion that DG, as other new technologies facing old equipment, needs to be 
studied with accurate simulations and analyses even when intuition suggests no further 
calculations are needed. It is the case demonstrated in [28]: it was discussed how an apparently 
useless measure as over-compensation of power factor brings to the injection of huge reactive 
power fluxes into the grid during the night. 
As a conclusion, all people involved into the DG field will have to deal with technical, juridical, 
environmental, economic issues in order to make the future grid work in the most efficient way. 
2.3 AGGREGATORS 
Distributed generation and demand response combined are helpful tools to improve business 
models, i.e. they allow to remunerate both active and passive end-users in the smart grids 
context. This is possible, for example, making them buy energy at its real-time price. Since this 
operation brings financial risks that end-users don’t want to be exposed to, a new figure able to 
shield users is required. A solution is represented by the ”aggregator” figure. That figure, who 
can be identified also as a ”virtual power player” (VPP), is supposed to cluster small users’ DR 
programs and interface with the DSO to communicate users’ schedules: in fact, a VPP can 
aggregate Distributed Generation and DR small size resources in order to use them as a large 
scale resource in the electricity market [29]. As said in [30], a VPP could be able to transact 
energy to the main grid, both absorbing it during high demand periods and injecting it when 
generation exceeds consumption. At the end of the operation, VPP has to remunerate units 
according to their contributions. 
VPPs represent a safe choice for small end-users, in fact these consumers [31]: 
• should constantly monitor the market; 
• should be always kept updated with all markets information 
• don’t have proper infrastructures (e.g. smart metering systems at the endpoints); 
• have the possibility to run fewer financial risks. 
In [31] REPs (retail electricity providers) are mentioned instead of aggregators but their roles 
are quite the same. REPs in fact can be seen as load aggregators or electricity suppliers able to 
connect end-users to the wholesale market. For that reason, it must essential for them to be 
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economically covered with contracts both with the supply side (in the pool market) and the 
demand side (in retail market). A combination of approaches can be done in order to better 
manage financial risks and remunerate end-users. One remuneration method consists in paying 
the maximum tariff of each group in which users were previously divided: for this reason the 
overall system is not economically optimized, there- fore other ways have to be studied. 
Several remuneration approaches have been presented in the literature [32] as the 
proportionality method, the equal percentage method and the factor G method: for all these 
methods a completely knowledge of information about every part involved is required. Lastly, 
another problem is represented by how groups are defined, i.e. the clustering operation. 
2.3.1 CLUSTERING 
Cluster computation can be based on one of the following methods [32]: the first one uses a 
hierarchical algorithm, showed in Fig.2.5 while the other one uses the fuzzy C-means method. 
 
Figure 2-5: Example of how a clustering method works [33] 
Hierarchical algorithm aims to obtain a hierarchy of clusters. A sequence of partitions is made 
in which each partition is nested into the next one in the sequence. Clusters are then formed in 
the form of a tree or hierarchy [34]. Starting for example from a set on N items, the most 
similar/closest pair is merged into a single cluster in order to get N-1 items totally. This iterative 
process is repeated until the imposed maximum number of clusters are computed. A 
computational tool commonly used the cluster function in MATLAB.  
The fuzzy C-means can be implemented too in MATLAB (fcm function). It is simpler than the 
previous one since it only needs a data matrix and the desired number of groups as input.  
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Actually another method of clustering exists, known as K-means (Fig.2.6). The first step 
consists in setting a number k of clusters. The main idea is to define k centroids, one for every 
cluster; and at each iteration distances between objects and all the centroids (that are randomly 
set) are computed. Every object is then associated to the nearest centroid, forming groups. Once 
it is done, new centroids have to be computed according to the distances among the objects 
inside that group. The iteration process stops when centroids don’t move anymore. 
2.3.2 REMUNERATIONS 
Choosing how to remunerate users who participate DR programs is one of the biggest 
challenges for a Virtual Power Player (VPP). Lot of ways are possible, but it must be kept in 
mind that VPP’s aim is to minimize overall operation costs. Results reported in [32] show total 
remuneration is less expensive for VPP when considering it by type of resource: obviously, if 
creating separate groups of sources implies huge computational costs, this approach has to be 
avoided. One of the easiest ways to remunerate sources is the ”maximum price per group” 
remuneration, as it is used in [36]: it’s not the most economic but it doesn’t imply high 
computational costs. 
Another possibility is represented by the ”proportional remuneration” that despite sounds the 
fairest one it requires lot of computational costs since each source’s contribution has to be 
computed. At last, the ”Pareto optimal solution” can be used as a remuneration method: in this 
case consumer’s surplus is at its maximum value and no one can improve his welfare without 
damaging others’.
Figure 2-6: Example of k-means clustering method [35] 
 2.4 ELECTRIC SYSTEM 
The electric system is defined as the whole of machines, devices and transmission lines able to 
produce, transform and transmit electrical energy from power sources to consumers (Fig.2.7). 
 
Since electricity doesn’t exist as a natural resource, it’s necessary to produce it. This process can take 
place in localized power plants or in distributed generation stations that use renewable sources. This 
latter option is quite recent and started to have influence on the electric system and market only in the 
last decades. Before that time electric system didn’t face important technological improvements such 
as smart grids: that is the reason why this new resource is proving people who work in this field with 
new challenges that deal with technical, juridical and economical constraints. 
There are different reasons for introducing new types of power sources into the electric system. For 
example, enabling the insertion of new electricity sources is one of the main reasons that brought to 
electricity market deregulation: the presence of more market players increases competition and, 
together with an increased production capacity, it results in prices reduction. Anyway, price of 
electricity produced by large conventional installations as fossil fuels and nuclear power plants is still 
too low for small units to be competitive [37]. 
Another reason for introducing new types of power generation is related to environmental issues: most 
of the conventional types of power plants emit carbon dioxide and other pollution gasses that 
dangerously increase global warming. Despite not all the conventional power stations produce carbon 
dioxide, environment and people’s health can be still exposed to that risks being pollution not localized 
only where power plants stand. For example, radioactive waste even from old nuclear power stations 
still represents a serious issue and large hydro-power’s reservoirs impact environment in an 
irreversible way. 
Figure 2-7: Traditional scheme of an electric system 
 A third reason for supporting small size “green” producers9 is represented by the power gap that every 
day occurs between consumption and production: a better match between the two curves can be 
reached thanks to the more precision available avoiding to waste money in large investments that only 
deliver huge blocks of power and take 10 or more years to be completed. Despite green sources total 
costs may be higher, investments would be spread over many owners resulting in a doable way of 
financing this kind of technologies [37]. 
Until now it has been said that green power sources (the so called “RES”, Renewable Energy Sources) 
can be competitive against fossil fuels plants, despite more in the long terms rather than in short ones. 
Focusing now on the transmission part, namely once energy is produced, it is fundamental to talk about 
new power lines construction. Installing new power lines that connect generator to users is often 
cheaper than building new power stations, that’s why it can be a very attractive solution. Since in most 
of the countries there’s not anymore a single entity in charge to control electricity production, 
transmission and distribution, that solution is very welcomed. Obviously, it is not only a matter of 
technical constraints. Also political, legal, financial and social aspects have to be taken into account 
(some studies focused on the impact of electro- magnetic waves produced by power transmission lines 
on human body [38], [39]). 
During the last two decades it has appeared of very high importance to develop a new system of grids 
able to take advantage of both electronic and telecommunication benefits. A transmission system able 
to connect users with grid operators and let them communicate their load conditions in order to better 
optimize power fluxes. That’s what a smart grid is supposed to be; in this scenario a player called 
“aggregator” will have the role of collecting small users’ information and dialogue with the 
Distribution System Operator (DSO). As a consequence, a high technological environment is needed, 
also because energy markets operate in real time and a fast and secure way to transmit information is 
essential. Fortunately, most of that required technologies are already under development since they’re 
used in other fields as communication and monitoring/control [6]. 
 
9 In literature small hydro power refers to units varying from 10kW to about 30MW. Sometimes they are classified as 
micro hydro (10–100 kW), mini hydro (100–500 kW), and small hydro (500 kW–30 MW) [37]. 
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2.5 ELECTRICITY MARKET 
Countries that don’t present a monopoly in energetic sector are characterized by an electricity 
market where players are involved and act in a competitive environment: this is supposed to be 
the way to increase power efficiency and reduce prices of the overall electric system. 
As presented in [20], electric energy is a commodity for which balance between demand and 
offer must be assured in any moment. That mandatory constraint makes inefficient the usual 
rules used with commodities markets; moreover, the impossibility to store energy in proper 
quantities makes the electric market very active. Price of electrical energy indeed is given by 
the intersection point of demand and offer curves and can vary lot of times during the day. 
Demand Response appears as a promising tool to keep power flows balanced without high 
operational costs as will be discussed in the next paragraphs. 
Energy costs consider several parameters, both concerning the production phase and the 
transmission one (construction or preservation of lines among others). Focusing on production 
costs, it must be reminded that they’re composed of a fixed component and a variable one. The 
first one comprehends all factors that don’t depend on the amount of sold energy: salaries, loans, 
leasing, return on investments are some of them. The variable component instead is proportional 
to production, as fuel’s and materials’ costs. The sum of both of them gives the minimum price 
an industrial activity has to present to the market in order to get  a rent. According to this price 
a bid is made by the generator: the best producers’ prices are selected by the market and they 
have to produce the offered power. 
This operation is called despatching. Besides the maximum power that a generating plant is 
able to offer, other constraints have to be considered such as lines losses (due to Joule effect) 
and lines’ congestions (that determine the maximum power that can flow in a specific line). 
There are two models of electricity market: Power Exchange and Pool. 
The Power Exchange (PX) model presents several markets that work on different time 
segments: all of them take place before the day T for which the power is being sold. This market 
model presents two trading modalities: the first one is constituted by a platform where blocks 
of power are traded for specific hours of the day/week, while the second one is the balancing 
market, necessary to maintain demand and supply always matched. Focusing on the balancing 
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market, it must be said that both generators and demand units can participate by varying 
generated power or by reducing loads. That allows to keep the grid stable and to cap energy 
prices. In this field, an important role is played by aggregators as they are supposed to converge 
power coming from numerous small generators: these generators in fact deal with the DSO 
(Distribution System Operator) through the aggregator, who remunerate them according to the 
exchanged power or loads curtailments. Since the aggregator figure will play an important role 
in future electricity markets, a deeper description will be done in the next paragraphs. As 
mentioned before, in the PX market both blocks of power and real time power are exchanged. 
Blocks are traded through the mean of bilateral contracts that allow to cover most of the forecast 
demand curve; anyway, in order to perfectly match demand and offer at any instant, real time 
power has to be traded too. 
Pool market model is a compulsory exchange where all generators can produce only if grid 
operator tells them so. Electricity price is set by crossing demand and supply curves, therefore 
is always changing during the day. Since this represents economic instability, some tools to 
avoid excessive risks have been implemented: in pool market the “contract for differences” is 
one of them. It consists in having a “spot price” taken as reference and considering the actual 
price of the energy: if the actual price is higher than the spot price then the producer is selling 
at a bigger price than the one settled and the difference will go to the purchaser. Vice versa, if 
purchaser buys energy at a lower price than the spot one, he is supposed to give the difference 
back to the producer. 
Also, power exchange market presents a tool that guarantees protection for both consumers and 
generators, i.e. the bilateral contract. By signing it, a capacity is committed for a given time: 
the purchaser indeed is expected to buy an amount of capacity for a settled quantity and price 
from the producer. 
Markets in Power Exchange 
As previously said, PX market is composed by further markets that take place in different 
moments before and during the day T for which the capacity is being sold. Here some electric 
markets will be listed as they work in the Italian context, since the structure is quite similar to 
most of the non-vertically integrated markets. 
The day ahead market has to select the operating power plants for the following day. It receives 
bids and offers from operators and list them according to a merit order (i.e. generators with 
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lowest production costs will be operated in preference to others). It also receives consumers 
offers in order to better foresee the load curve of the day after. Generally this market it’s 
scheduled for each hour of the following day, therefore a producer can make up to 24 bids. It’s 
named after the closing day, that happens to be the day before the T day. It’s open well ahead 
the T day, even one week earlier. A specific commercial institution manages it and tells the 
TSO (Transmission System Operator) which power stations are going to be operative. 
The adjustment market presents the same structure as the day ahead market, but it opens after 
its closure. It’s supposed to be used to adjust generation profiles in order to better match the 
demand curve. 
The infra-daily market opens once the previous two are closed. It’s aimed at adjusting again 
the power that’s going to be produced/requested until few hours earlier of the power exchange 
moment. It’s composed by sessions (up to 24) as the day ahead market. Sessions are organized 
as implicit auctions with different closing time and in sequence. 
The balancing market collects the prices that producers and consumers intend to get since they 
are going to change their power profiles. TSO then put them in a merit order and will call them 
according to the real time needs: traded capacity is known only afterwards then. 
The ancillary services market can be supplied or through long term contracts or in the daily 
market. Ancillary services are related to load balancing, the three types of reserve (primary, 
secondary and tertiary), losses, reactive power regulation and black start service (for black-out 
events). A power station can operate only in this type of market since the remuneration can be 
as the same level as the other markets. This market starts when the others are closed. 
Market for capacity represents an alternative way for the generators to be paid. In fact they are 
paid according to the capacity made available, that is not necessarily used. 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter it has been presented an overview of the state of the art about Demand Response 
and the context in which it can flourish (Distributed Generation). Some types of remunerations 
have been presented, showing that every scenario has its own way to apply remuneration 
(according to user voltage, load type, how much loss of comfort is possible for the consumer 
are some conditions). Since big amounts of data and information about power exchanges are 
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going to be analysed in this high-developed field, figures able to gather and manage them will 
assume lot of importance. That’s why some clustering methods and, more in general, 
aggregators, have been presented. Finally, electricity market structure has been discussed, 
showing some market types since DR can be a tool that fits all of them.
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3 Elasticity 
As already explained in the introduction, this chapter is dedicated to elasticity parameter 
definition. Its mathematical expression is given and explained; moreover some conceptual 
variations made by experts in the past (especially in the economy field) are reported because 
they may inspire a new work similar to this one. 
3.1 DEFINITION 
As already introduced, elasticity is defined by the formula 3.1 
𝑒 =
𝛥𝑄 𝑄⁄
𝛥𝑃 𝑃⁄
 
(3.1) 
where Q represents the initial demanded quantity, ∆Q its variation, P the initial price and ∆P its 
variation. Elasticity is then computed as the relative change in quantity over the relative change 
in price, representing the availability of a user to vary its power absorption after a remuneration. 
Two types of price elasticity are defined in literature: own-price elasticity and substitution (or 
cross) elasticity. The first one can reveal how customers adjust their consumptions after 
increases in prices of electricity: it might result useful to evaluate long-term adjustments to 
changes in electricity prices. The second one instead focuses on how consumers substitute one 
good for another or how they switch periods of consumptions after price variations. 
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By analyzing own-price elasticity curves, two different kinds have been defined: if demanded 
quantity responds to price changes in a greater than proportional manner the curve is said to be 
elastic (e>1). Otherwise, an inelastic demand curve represents a situation in which a percentage 
variation in price will causes a smaller percentage change in quantity demanded (e<1) [40]. For 
a commodity the range of inelasticity is usually between 0 and 1 while the elastic range begins 
with values greater than 1. 
Elasticity value depends on the type of consumer and other factors as climate, day of the week 
and load’s conditions and localization [32]. Anyway, that value may be not constant in time. 
For this reason the short-run elasticity and long-run elasticity terms have been introduced10: 
• short-run elasticity describes the price-response from the system with its current 
infrastructure and equipment [41]; 
• long-run elasticity considers those investments that can be made in response to higher 
prices [41]. 
Their values can be very different as lot of factors influence the long-run one: industrial sector 
in particular is very price-sensitive due to its high electricity consumptions. Burke and 
Abayasekara [42] found that in the US short-run elasticity presents values around -0.1 for any 
type of user (residential, commercial, industrial); long-run elasticity instead appears to be much 
larger, around -1.0, specially for the industrial sector11. 
Elasticity estimation represents a challenge for everyone who wants to study scenarios that 
involve Demand Response: basing on that estimations it is possible to predict how every 
category of user is going to change its power absorption in the short/long time. By knowing 
that profiles, the entire electric system can benefit shifting loads from periods where the 
generation availability is lacking to others when it is abundant. As a result, all the available 
power is used in each moment of the day maintaining the system balanced. Other aspects have 
to be considered. First of all, the socio-economic impact, as people can change their habits 
following social models or trends. Political choices contribute too to make people variate energy 
consumptions, in order to better achieve environmental goals or energy efficiency in general. 
 
10 Despite these terms were introduced into the economy field, they can be applied in this context too. 
11 In this report only absolute values are considered in order to do better comparisons. Positive values are given 
indeed by a consumer point of view remuneration. Vice versa, negative are from a DNO’s. 
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3.2 ELASTICITY EVALUATION 
A good elasticity evaluation allows to better match power production and demand curves in 
every moment along the 24 hours. Elasticity is indeed a parameter strictly related to each type 
of consumer, his habits, weather forecasts, time and location [32]. Until now only fixed or 
estimated values have been used [43]: moreover, these values cover ranges that can be very 
wide. Hyndman and Fan [44] collected data from past studies that dealt with elasticity 
definition. Their conclusion is that all data from different sources “are not very consistent” since 
for short-term elasticity numbers range from -0.2 to -0.4 while for long-term elasticity from 
- 0.5 to -0.7 (Table 3.112). 
Because of that, it may be interesting to define precise values able to follow users’ conditions 
day by day. It has been proved that important advantages would derive from that: 
▪ optimal use of available power in the grid avoiding congestions; 
▪ reduced volatility of nodal spot price [11]; 
▪ reduce exceeding power production saving fuel and avoiding machine 
damages; 
▪ diminish power production from carbon plants with environmental 
benefits; 
▪ power exchanges with neighbor markets are reduced giving more 
political and economic independence to each region/country;  
 
12 All data are taken from studies made before 2007. Since DR programs and Renewable Energies started to 
strongly influence market/politics especially in the last decade (after 2010), these values can be very different from 
the actual context. 
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Table 3-1: Summary of the literature on price elasticity end-users 
 
 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Elasticity evaluation importance has been justified after showing its definition. At the end, in 
section 3.2, it has been explained why new values are needed, especially values that follow 
power demand trend and are able to update continuously along the day. All values showed are 
indeed taken from papers before 2010: new green politics, new consumers’ habits and new 
possibilities have been influenced energy world from that year (e.g. the incrementing 
penetration of electric vehicles, smart meters, roadmaps that aims at diminishing pollution…), 
therefore those values need to be updated.  
Researcher Year Region Sector Elasticity 
Bohi 
& 
Zimmerman 
1984 U.S. Residential, 
industrial and 
commercial 
For residential only 
short-run: -0.2 
long-run: -0.7 
Filippini 1999 Swiss 
(40 cities) 
Aggregation -0.3 
Beenstock 
et al. 
1999 Israel Residential 
and 
industrial 
Residential: 
from -0.21 to -0.58 
Industrial: 
from -0.002 to -0.44 
NIER 
(National Inst. 
of Economic 
and Industrial 
Research) 
2007 Australia Residential, 
industrial 
and 
commercial 
 
Residential: 0.25 
Industrial:0.38 
Commercial: 0.35 
King 
& 
Shatrawka 
1997 England Residential 
and 
industrial 
From 0.1 
to 0.2 
Patrick 
& 
Wolak 
1997 England 
and 
Wales 
Industrial 
and 
commercial 
Water supply 
industry: 
from -0.142 to -0.27 
King 
& 
Chatterjee 
2003 California Residential 
and 
commercial 
From -0.1 
to -0.4 
Reiss 2005 California Residential -0.39 
Faruqui 
&  
Georg
e 
2005 California Residential, 
industrial and 
commercial 
Reducing consumptions 
in peak-periods following 
RTP: 
0.09 
Taylor et al. 2005 U.K. Industrial From -0.05 
to -0.26 
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4 Developed Methods 
In this chapter it is discussed the method adopted to obtain elasticity from graphs and how that 
value can be used to make demand curve more predictable. 
Data relative to Portuguese power production and consumption of different users divided on 
their voltage level13 have been analyzed. Three main sections divide the final work: 
1. Proof that elasticity can be obtained from ∆P-∆Q plots; 
2. Consequences of elasticity estimation errors; 
3. Elasticity change from weekday to weekends. 
Section 1: Getting elasticity from plots 
Price and power absorption variations are considered because elasticity is defined as the ratio 
of their relative variations before and after DR. As said in [6], response of consumers to price 
variations should not be assumed as totally flexible since constraints as maximum load 
reduction, price caps, load and generation balance are present; these constraints will not be 
considered because for now the only goal is to explain how to obtain elasticity from graphs. A 
plot that represents a ∆P/P trend over ∆Q/Q is characterized by an angular coefficient that is 
 
13 MAT, AT, MT, BTE, BTN-2, BTN- 1. 
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the reciprocal of elasticity. It can be seen comparing equation 4.1 with 4.2. 
𝑒 =
𝛥𝑄 𝑄⁄
𝛥𝑃 𝑃⁄
 
(4.1) 
𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 =
𝛥𝑃 𝑃⁄
𝛥𝑄 𝑄⁄
=  
1
𝑒
  
(4.2) 
Sometimes in literature positive signs for elasticity are reported, sometimes negative ones. This 
is because signs of slopes are related to ∆P definition14. Negative elasticity sign indicates that 
consumption reduces after an increase in price and positive signs indicates the reverse case [17]. 
Elasticity was found by making up scenarios of DR. In particular, an increasing power limit cap 
was used: 10-15-20-25% of load reduction was indeed imposed. In every case the exceeding 
power is supposed to be paid at the medium tariff instead of the most expensive one in order to 
get the ∆P and ∆Q required for the calculation. To compute elasticity (4.3) has been used. 
𝑒 =
𝛥𝑄 𝑄⁄
𝛥𝑃 𝑃⁄
 
(4.3) 
Obviously, the reverse thinking can be done, i.e. obtaining ΔP/P values starting from ΔQ/Q. It 
would be a different case from what presented previously since in this last case different 
scenarios relative to the overall Portuguese power are considered and not each different user 
type. The last quantity to be defined is Qfin, given by equation 4.4, obtained adjusting 4.3: 
𝑄𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 ∗
𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑛 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝑖𝑛
+ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 
(4.4) 
Focusing on plot construction, it is known that e constitutes the slope of lines: this factor, 
together with 2 points which the line passes through, gives the plot for each DR scenario. Using 
regressions equations, relative price variations ΔP/P can be used as input to compute relative 
power variations ΔQ/Q (since Qin would be a known parameter too, it’s easy to get Qfin). 
This first step demonstrated that elasticity value can be derived from real data. As already said, 
most of the times values from non-updated tables are used to classify end-users: obtaining 
elasticity from actual consumption data instead allows to deal with more precise values.  
 
14 ∆P is given by the difference of final price Pfin (after DR) minus initial price Pin (before DR); if  price decreases, 
∆P assumes negative sign. 
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Section 2: Impacts of wrong estimations of elasticity 
 
Having an elasticity value for each user type allows the DNO to estimate how much power is 
available thanks to DR program during a specific event. Unfortunately, inaccurate estimations 
can occur: consequences both on ∆P and ∆Q evaluations are then to be considered. In the first 
case users could expect to be remunerated with another value of ∆P while in the second case 
the actual available power for the DNO would be different from the predicted one. 
The following procedure has been adopted, represented in Fig.4.1. 
The three tariffs scheduled over the day (according to the triple tariff contract) are plotted 
together with power consumption trend. In this way it is possible to define specific DR 
programs able to focus on different parts of the day where high consumptions coincide with 
peak tariff. More than one scenario are possible, depending on how energy needs to be moved 
into “valley energy” hours and how to remunerate consumers. Figure 4.2 at the end of this 
section shows all possible choices considered by the author. Only initial conditions would differ 
between scenarios since after imposing them, elasticity computation and saving calculations 
algorithms would be the same.  
In particular, “scenario A” consists in applying a power cap to consumptions: if they exceed 
that limit, DR program starts and power reduction is imposed. In this case power cap is chosen 
to be 115% of the average power absorbed during the day, in order to have a value proportionate 
Figure 4-1: Scheme of algorithm used to evaluate error on remuneration 
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to every user. At this point, as for all other scenarios, it has to be decided whether moving 
energy to a less expensive period or simply reduce consumption. This last choice represents a 
more drastic change to consumers’ habits but allows them to save more money. 
Once obtained ∆P15 and ∆Q16 is possible to evaluate elasticity. That value is computed every 15 
minutes since consumptions are measured by that time. This allows to have more elasticity 
values following power trend and not a single value for all day. Once elasticity is found, it can 
be used to evaluate Qfin. 
𝑄𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 ∗
𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑛 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝑖𝑛
+ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 
(4.5) 
Since this work aims to define a way to predict consumptions starting from given elasticities, a 
model is needed. That is why elasticity values have been modeled by mean of interpolating 
functions: the equation that has been found is supposed to be used by DNOs to predict their 
consumers’ behavior. In order to see the reliability of the interpolation, MAPE value is 
computed taking as input “real” elasticities values and interpolated ones.  
𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸 =
100%
𝑛
∗ ∑ |
𝐴𝑖 − 𝐹𝑖
𝐴𝑖
|
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
(4.6) 
In order to have a feedback from an economic perspective, Qfin is found by mean of 4.6 with 
the new elasticity values and the overall costs are computed basing on these new power values. 
New Qfin values are used to compute ∆Q, since Qin is the same as before. ∆Q is then used as 
input in ∆P-∆Q plots taken from literature in order to find ∆P. 
The con of this method (“scenario A”) is that it’s based on historic estimations, needed to 
evaluate the average power used as cap. They may be different from real-time consumptions, 
so the model can be inaccurate.  
Scenario B and C need to be mentioned, as they can be applied in real cases too. The first one 
imposes a power cap during peak tariff period. That power cap is 15-20-25% of the contracted 
power, therefore no historic data are needed. Also in this case energy can be shifted to other 
periods, so consumers wouldn’t lose too much comfort having the same amount of energy 
 
15 Given by the highest tariff minus the one used to remunerate the consumer. 
16 Given by the load reduction. 
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during the day. This solution is more expensive as one could have expected. According to 
scenario C instead, power consumption is increased during low tariff periods in order to reduce 
consumption during high ones. Again, total energy can be conserved over the 24h.  
 
Figure 4-2: Representation of application of possible scenarios 
Section 3: Elasticity on weekdays and weekends 
 
Considerations about elasticity evolution through the week have been done. During the week it 
was stated that in particular time frames elasticity evolves according to load reduction and 
remunerations values. During weekends instead, elasticity is not easily definable since not 
always multiple tariffs are present (on Sundays only one is present) and on Saturday only two 
tariffs blocks divide the day: one for the day and the other for the night. Consumers simply 
diminish power absorptions if they want to save money, not because they are asked to. 
Therefore it is not properly correct to talk about DR, also because ∆P is not as big as during the 
week.   
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4.1 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter is supposed to be used as a reference for whoever is interested in developing 
scenarios/methods similar to the ones used in this work. This chapter presented the study in 
general terms, explaining what is going to be discussed in the following chapter (where real 
data are used). Different sections are shown separately in order to better understand each tool’s 
applications. It has been chosen to present the work as a succession of steps in order to better 
guide who wants to follow a detailed procedure in this kind of study.  
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5 Numerical Analysis 
In this chapter results obtained working on Portuguese grid data are presented. The algorithms 
used have been already explained in previous section but some descriptions are given again in 
order to better comprehend numeric results. 
5.1 APPLICATION OF DR PROGRAM TO GET ELASTICITY 
Section 1: Getting elasticity from plots 
It has been already showed that elasticity is the reciprocal of slope in ∆P/P-∆Q/Q plots. Figure 
5.1 represents points taken from real data, for each user type, and their interpolations. Six 
classifications between users are present, but only 5 interpolating lines are showed: this is 
because BTE and BTN-2 users’ consumptions are equal, so their respective lines are overlying. 
BTN-2 consumptions alter elasticity estimation too, as can be seen in Table 5.1. It lists lines’ 
slopes, elasticity obtained from them and “original” values17 to be used as comparison. Since 
there’s not sensible difference between computed values and the given ones (last 2 columns), 
the reliability of the analytical method is demonstrated. 
In Tab.5.1 absolute values of elasticities are reported in order to do an easier comparison with 
the input data (reported in the last column). 
 
17 Used by Portuguese grid operator.  
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Table 5-1: Values of slope and elasticity 
User type slope |e| Original e value 
MAT -1.887 0.52999788 0.53 
AT -2.222 0.45000450 0.45 
MT -2.439 0.41000410 0.41 
BTE -2.703 0.37000037 0.37 
BTN-2 -2.703 0.30000009 0.37 
BTN-1 -3.704 0.27000027 0.27 
Figure 5.1 shows ∆P/P as function of ∆Q/Q, that is used as input in that case. Elasticity was 
then found by computing lines’ slopes. What if the DNO wanted to know how much power is 
going to be available after a specific remuneration ∆P? Remuneration ∆P would now represent 
the input value and ∆Q the output one. In this case, elasticity, ∆P and Qin are needed in order to 
plot lines from which evaluate ∆Q (as shown in Figure 5.2). Elasticity was found by making up 
a DR scenario: an increasing power limit cap to load profile by 10%, 15%, 20% and 25 was 
imposed (that also allows to compute Qfin and ∆Q since Qin is already given). In each case the 
exceeding power is supposed to be paid at the medium tariff instead of the most expensive one, 
therefore also ∆P was defined, that is needed for the calculation. 
Figure 5-1: ∆P/P over ∆Q/Q plot for each type of user 
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To compute elasticity, the traditional formula has been used (5.1), that is here reported: 
𝑒 =
𝛥𝑄 𝑄⁄
𝛥𝑃 𝑃⁄
 
(5.1) 
and the following values have been found for each case (Tab.5.2): 
Table 5-2: Elasticity values for different DR programs 
Power cut 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Elasticity values 0.2349656 0.3524485 0.4699313 0.5874141 
 
As it was expected, the more power cut (∆Q), the more elastic the user results (keeping same 
∆P18). It worth to be noticed that 20% would be an affordable load cut for some users and that 
would result in an elasticity value way higher than the usual (that is around 0.35). 
The last quantity to be defined is Qfin, given by the equation (5.2): 
𝑄𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 ∗
𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑛 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝑖𝑛
+ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 
(5.2) 
 
18 ∆P value was constant and given by Pfin(=0.1571)-Pin(=0.2735) = -0.1164 [€/kWh]. 
Figure 5-2: ∆Q/Q over ∆P/P plot for each scenario 
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∆P/P is a fixed value (being the switching always from the most expensive tariff to the medium 
one) and is -0.42559415 [€/kWh]. The chosen Qin is 4717.488421 [MW] (the number itself is 
a less important parameter since the final relation is the object of this section). These values 
together with elasticities give the following ∆Q/Q19: -0.10, -0.15, -0.20, -0.25. 
 
Table 5-3: Coordinates to plot ∆Q/Q over ∆P/P 
Power cut 0 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Elasticity 0 0.2349656 0.3524485 0.4699313 0.5874141 
∆P/P (x) 0 -0.4255942 -0.4255942 -0.4255942 -0.4255942 
∆Q/Q (y) 0 -0.1 -0.15 -0.20 -0.25 
Microsoft Excel’s tools allowed to obtain regression lines’ equations (showed in figure 5.2).  
Two of them present a constant term due to “machine accuracy”: lines are indeed supposed to 
pass through axes origin (0;0). In any case, these constant terms are very small (magnitude 
around 10-17) therefore they don’t affect results. 
Using regression equations, relative price variations can be used as input to compute relative 
power variations (since Qin would be a known parameter too, these equations allow to find Qfin).  
 
19 Since there’s a linear relation between ∆P, ∆Q and e, it makes sense to obtain these values. 
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Section 2: Effects of wrong elasticity estimations on ∆P and ∆Q 
This part of the work presents how elasticity was found starting from data consumption. Data 
from Portuguese grid were used. The adopted DR program was made up by the author. During 
the weekdays, 3 different tariffs are applied along the 24h; their values are shown in Table 5.4 
Table 5-4: Classification of different tariff values 
Tariffs classification T1 - Expensive T2 - Medium T3 - Cheap 
Prices [€/kWh] 0.2253 0.1765 0.1016 
At the end of this chapter a table that summarizes tariff distribution over the day is presented. 
Now a graph (Fig. 5.3) shows tariff evolution over the 24h of a random week-day (from Monday 
to Friday) according to a Portuguese DNO (EDP). 
Tariffs follow power demand trend, in fact they are supposed to incentivize energy consumption 
when it’s available in high quantity. Figure 5.4 shows power consumption trend (orange line): 
some improvements can be done, especially from 18:45 to 22:15 where high consumptions 
coincide with tariff peak for most of the time. 
Figure 5-3: Graph of tariff trend along the day 
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The following DR scenario was supposed by the author20: during high consumption periods, 
users’ power has been cut. Power-cap limit was imposed to be the 115% of the power value 
averaged along the 24h of the day. It is supposed to be acceptable by most of the population 
since power reduction occurs only if high demand periods coincide with high tariff (so only a 
limit period of time). Moreover, calculations showed that not more than 12% of consumption 
has to be reduced. 
Unfortunately there’s one significant disadvantage of this method: average power (red line in 
Fig.5.5) is an estimation obtained from historic data. In fact all the measurements over the 24h 
are needed to compute the average power (and also its 115% value): the same day of the 
previous week can be considered, or the same day of the previous year, or simply the day before. 
All these possibilities present uncertainty related especially to weather conditions that can vary 
significantly from one day to another. 
A potential improvement of this method is to impose a “minimum power cap” too in order to 
maintain absorbed power within a certain gap, e.g. ±15% of the average power. This would 
guarantee more balance from a grid point of view, allowing power plants to be more constant 
in electricity production (with benefits both in terms of costs and machine use). In that case 
end-users should be taught these benefits since they are not intuitive, in fact consumption during 
 
20 Previously presented as “Scenario A”. 
Figure 5-4: Graph of power trend along the day (Monday) 
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night hours would actually increase. 
By applying this scenario, graph of Fig.5.6 is obtained. Yellow line represents the 115% of the 
average power and it is used as power cap: green line (power absorption in this case) is then 
limited when it would exceed that limit. That explains the flat section in the evening hours. In 
Appendix A instead, all consumption data are reported: every 15 minutes its relative tariff, 
power before DR and power after DR has been computed21. 
Power-cut is going to be the numerator of elasticity formula (5.1). For what concerns the 
denominator ∆P/P, an important consideration has to be said. Pfin is the price of the T2 tariff, 
while Pin is the most expensive one, T1. Therefore ∆P is given by 0,2253-0,1765=0,0488 
[€/kWh]. This means that when consumption is above power cap (green flat part in Fig.5.6), 
T2 tariff is applied to limited power (instead of T1 to the actual consumption). Having ∆Q and 
∆P allows to evaluate elasticity: obviously, it can be defined only during the DR period, namely 
the flat section. It has been chosen to pay the reduced power at T2 instead of T3 tariff because 
it could represent a money loss way too big for distribution operators: costs optimization in fact 
involves electric system as a whole, considering both consumers’ and producers’ interests. 
 
21 DR lasts from 18:15 to 23:30 as can be seen in the A Appendix (yellow cells on the right). 
 
Figure 5-5: A Monday power trend, its average (red) and its 115% (yellow) 
42  
Proceeding with elasticity evaluation, computations brought these results (left column of 
Tab.5.5). They have been plotted (Fig.5.7) and the interpolating equation has been reported on 
the graph: it was used to compute interpolation points (right column of Table 5.5). 
Table 5-5: Elasticity values during DR and their interpolations 
Elasticity during DR Interpolated elasticity values 
0.272643 0.263143 
0.278420 0.295166 
0.332867 0.323482 
0.343586 0.348092 
0.373156 0.368995 
0.374898 0.386192 
0.406371 0.399682 
0.412945 0.409465 
0.422696 0.415542 
0.410091 0.417913 
A model has been created then. It is supposed to be used by the DNO to estimate how much 
power end-users are going to reduce during DR program. 
In this work it has been evaluated how much an error in this estimation can influence in terms 
of ∆Q. In particular, Qfin has been computed with interpolated values of elasticity and then 
Figure 5-6: Power trend imposing the 115% cap 
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compared with the “original” ones. Qfin is given by equation 5.3, obtained from elasticity 
definition; original values and computed ones (during DR) are reported in Table 5.6. 
𝑄𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 ∗
𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑛 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝑖𝑛
+ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 
(5.3) 
There’s not big difference between real Qfin values and computed ones, proving that the found 
interpolation is quite precise. 
 
Figure 5-7: Elasticity values interpolation 
Table 5-6: Qfin values in [MW] with real and interpolated elasticity 
Real Qfin Computed Qfin Difference: Real-Computed 
5565.2329 5577.4033 12.1704 
5565.2329 5543.7511 -21.4818 
5565.2329 5577.4248 12.1919 
5565.2329 5559.3648 -5.8681 
5565.2329 5570.6899 5.4571 
5565.2329 5550.4154 -14.8175 
5565.2329 5574.0748 8.8419 
5565.2329 5569.8387 4.6058 
5565.2329 5574.7247 9.4918 
5565.2329 5554.8849 -10.3479 
Total [MW] Total [MW] Total [MW] 
55652.3291 55652.5726 0.2435 
Another way to demonstrate the accuracy of the method is given by the measurement of its 
MAPE (Mean Absolute Percentage Error), expressed by equation 5.4. According to [45], 
measures under 10 of MAPE are to be considered of highly accurate forecasting. In this case 
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MAPE=2.3846 meaning that this method is reliable. 
𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸 =
100%
𝑛
∗ ∑ |
𝐴𝑖 − 𝐹𝑖
𝐴𝑖
|
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
(5.4) 
In equation 5.4, n stands for the number of elements, Ai stands for the “Actual i-th value” and 
Fi the interpolated one. Once new Qfin are defined, let’s see how they impact on remuneration. 
First of all, it’s important to obtain a relation between ∆P and ∆Q. Working on data from 
Portuguese grid, some graphs have been plotted. All of them showed that points follow an 
almost-linear behaviour. 
In the following chapter it is discussed how these graphs can be interpolated with a linear 
regression, a quadratic, a cubic or logarithmic interpolation. Since it will be demonstrated that 
all of them (except the logarithmic one) present MAPE<10, for now only the linear one will be 
used for some ∆P considerations. 
At this point, interpolated Qfin (and their differences from real Qfin values) have been obtained. 
It assumes importance to study the economic impact of new Qfin values: for that purpose, plots 
as the one represented in Fig.5.8 will be used. Thanks to interpolation equation it’s possible to 
compute ∆P for each ∆Q given as input. The MAT user has been chosen as default user, since 
DR programs will involve very likely high voltage levels in the first steps. Any other possible 
voltage user could have been studied: author’s choice doesn’t compromise studies of other 
consumer types. 
Plot 5.8 shows original values of ∆P over ∆Q (blue points). Interpolated points (orange) are 
instead found thanks to Microsoft Excel tools, as well as the interpolation line equation (see 
equation 5.5). 
y = -1.447*10-04 x + 6.425*10-06 (5.5) 
 
45  
Right column values of Table 5.6 have been used as input in equation 5.5 and the remuneration 
values showed in Tab.5.7 have been obtained. 
Table 5-7: ∆P values from computed ∆Q 
∆Q [MW] ∆P [€/kWh] 
12.1704 -0.00175462316 
-21.482 0.00311483762 
12.1919 -0.00175774186 
-5.8681 0.00085554625 
5.45714 -0.00078321440 
-14.818 0.00215051835 
8.84193 -0.00127299928 
4.60581 -0.00066003365 
9.49182 -0.00136704222 
-10.348 0.00150376823 
Total [MW] Total [€/kWh] 
0.2435 -0.00002880913 
From Table 5.7 it can be seen that a gap of ∆Q from the actual values impacts on ∆P for no 
more than ∼0.003 [€/kWh] during DR. Economically speaking, in the worst case scenario from 
a DNO point of view (meaning that he has to pay more than expected due to more available 
power), the amount of money that would have been wasted would be ∼50€. In order to compute 
that, the following hypothesis was made: all ∆Q have been taken with positive sign, as to say 
that all the production was exceeding and it had to be remunerated. 
Figure 5-8: Plot of ∆P over ∆Q (MAT user) 
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The following steps have been followed: 
1. Take absolute values of ∆Q (left column of Table 5.8); 
2. Apply to each ∆Q its ∆P22 (right column in Table 5.8) 
3. Multiply all results by 0.25 because each measure is relative to 15 minutes23; 
4. Sum all the results in order to get overall money. 
Table 5-8: Values used to compute worst case scenario 
|∆Q| ∆P |∆Q|·∆P·0.25·1000 
12.170 0.00175462316 5.3386 
21.482 0.00311483762 16.728 
12.192 0.00175774186 5.3576 
5.8681 0.00085554625 1.2551 
5.4571 0.00078321440 1.0685 
14.818 0.00215051835 7.9663 
8.8419 0.00127299928 2.8139 
4.6058 0.00066003365 0.7599 
9.4918 0.00136704222 3.2439 
10.348 0.00150376823 3.8902 
Total [MW] Total [€/kWh] Total [€] 
105.27 0.01522032502 48.422243 
An error of ∼48.5€ represents more or less 0,0231% of the money volume that has been shifted 
from T1 tariff to T2. It can be considered an acceptable amount compared to benefits brought 
by DR. 
Elasticity interpolation can be used by DNO in order to compute how much power will be 
available the day after thanks to DR programs. In the past, where every user type was classified 
by a specific constant elasticity value, available power was calculated by mean of the already 
presented (5.6): 
𝑄𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 ∗
𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑛 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝑖𝑛
+ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 
(5.6) 
 
22 Since ∆P is expressed in [€/kWh] and power in [MW], a multiplication of ∆Q by a factor 1000 is needed to 
convert MW into kW. 
23 25 is indeed the decimal expression of 15 minutes.  
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that gave a unique value supposed to work the entire day/week/year. For instance, let’s consider 
e = -0.38 (as indicated for Industrial consumers in Tab.3.1): given the initial power (Qin) and 
∆P = 0.0488 [€/kWh], Qfin is then calculated. In order to better compare Qfin with different 
elasticity values, in Tab.5.9 all Qfin are reported for each case. An average value of Qfin for 
“literature elasticity” case and “interpolated” one was computed: successively, a comparison 
between them and the “real elasticity” case was done to see how much power is being wasted 
due to a non-accurate elasticity definition. Looking at Tab.5.9, the average value of Qfin of the 
upper table is Qfin=6537.907699 [MW]; the one of the middle table is 6516.18476 [MW] while 
the last one is 6516.16041 [MW]. The difference between the first 2 values is -21.7229 [MW], 
whilst the difference between 2nd and 3rd table is 0.02435 [MW]. That shows how an elasticity 
interpolation brings an average error, in terms of excess unexpected power, of only 24 [kW] 
while the fixed value gives a lack of almost 22 [MW]. 
 
Figure 5-9: Plot of trend of 3 elasticities cases: fixed, real, interpolated one 
In plot 5.9 a comparison of trends of 3 elasticities values is represented: the fixed value e=0.38, 
the real value (extrapolated from real data) and the interpolated one.  
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Table 5-9: Effects of different elasticities on Qfin given ∆P=0.0488 [€/kWh] 
Literature Elasticity Q in [MW] Q fin [MW] 
0.38 5914.51146 6401.323265 
0.38 5922.38693 6409.846952 
0.38 5997.65854 6491.314022 
0.38 6012.70323 6507.597008 
0.38 6054.60039 6552.942642 
0.38 6057.08581 6555.632636 
0.38 6102.36342 6604.636952 
0.38 6111.90505 6614.963933 
0.38 6126.11484 6630.343307 
0.38 6107.75867 6610.476271 
 
Real Elasticity Q in [MW] Q fin [MW] 
0.272643036 5914.511457 6263.790008 
0.278419814 5922.386929 6279.540953 
0.332867248 5997.658541 6430.084176 
0.343586299 6012.703228 6460.173550 
0.373156486 6054.600389 6543.967873 
0.374897794 6057.085812 6548.938720 
0.406371391 6102.363418 6639.493931 
0.412944526 6111.905046 6658.577187 
0.422695562 6126.114842 6686.996775 
0.410090648 6107.758665 6650.284425 
 
Interpolated Elasticity Q in [MW] Q fin [MW] 
0.263143001 5914.511457 6251.619668 
0.295165955 5922.386929 6301.022727 
0.323482324 5997.658541 6417.892283 
0.348092108 6012.703228 6466.041699 
0.368995309 6054.600389 6538.510793 
0.386191925 6057.085812 6563.756227 
0.399681958 6102.363418 6630.652022 
0.409465406 6111.905046 6653.971391 
0.415542269 6126.114840 6677.504949 
0.417912549 6107.758665 6660.632339 
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Section 3: Change of elasticity value during weekends 
Being elasticity strictly correlated to ∆P and ∆Q, it can be defined only if a consumer is 
participating DR program. Data used until now suggest that on Sunday it is not necessary for 
the consumer to cut his power, since only a small amount of it is requested by the entire grid 
(comparing to the weekdays) and no congestions occur. That’s why elasticity is usually not 
defined for this particular day. In fact double/triple tariffs contracts present only one tariff on 
Sundays and moving loads into different periods would result only in a useless loss of comfort 
for the consumer. 
As already mentioned, other reasons influence elasticity value, as the weather, user’s particular 
habits and routines or even unexpected events (fault in the domestic electric system for 
example). Previously in this work it was showed also that these reasons are responsible for 
different values of elasticity even along the same day when participating DR programs. 
Now then, a comparison between elasticity during a Monday and a Saturday day will be done. 
Only daily average values will be considered, since the goal of this section is to demonstrate 
the difference between a given elasticity value for a weekday and for a weekend day. 
Second and third tables of Tab.5.9 are considered, whose average values are 0.3627672804 and 
0.3627672803 respectively. Therefore 0.363 (their average) will be used for this section. In  
order to compare elasticity in 2 different days, the same DR program has to be applied. 
Therefore even for Saturday it will be imposed a power cap of 15% of the average power: if 
there will be exceeding power during the highest tariff, it will be paid at the cheapest one24. 
Calculations brought user to participate to DR from 18:45 to 22:00, where there was high 
consumption during the most expensive tariff. The average value of elasticity (in absolute 
terms) found out for that period is 0.185, almost half of the value during the week. 
As a conclusion, it can be stated that during the week a consumer is more willing to participate 
DR due to highest ∆P and then remunerations. A social aspect has to be considered too: during 
weekends people may need more electric energy for leisure activities or other types of needs. 
 
24 It may be helpful to remember that on Saturday only 2 tariffs are scheduled: ”Vazio”- 0.1016 [€/kWh] and 
”Cheias”- 0.1765 [€/kWh] 
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Table 5-10: Tariffs along the 24h: colours help to understand their trend 
Hour Tariff Value  Hour Tariff Value  Hour Tariff Value 
00:15 T3 0.1016  08:15 T2 0.1765  16:15 T2 0.1765 
00:30 T3 0.1016  08:30 T2 0.1765  16:30 T2 0.1765 
00:45 T3 0.1016  08:45 T2 0.1765  16:45 T2 0.1765 
01:00 T3 0.1016  09:00 T2 0.1765  17:00 T2 0.1765 
01:15 T3 0.1016  09:15 T2 0.1765  17:15 T2 0.1765 
01:30 T3 0.1016  09:30 T2 0.1765  17:30 T2 0.1765 
01:45 T3 0.1016  09:45 T1 0.2253  17:45 T2 0.1765 
02:00 T3 0.1016  10:00 T1 0.2253  18:00 T2 0.1765 
02:15 T3 0.1016  10:15 T1 0.2253  18:15 T2 0.1765 
02:30 T3 0.1016  10:30 T1 0.2253  18:30 T2 0.1765 
02:45 T3 0.1016  10:45 T1 0.2253  18:45 T1 0.2253 
03:00 T3 0.1016  11:00 T1 0.2253  19:00 T1 0.2253 
03:15 T3 0.1016  11:15 T1 0.2253  19:15 T1 0.2253 
03:30 T3 0.1016  11:30 T1 0.2253  19:30 T1 0.2253 
03:45 T3 0.1016  11:45 T1 0.2253  19:45 T1 0.2253 
04:00 T3 0.1016  12:00 T1 0.2253  20:00 T1 0.2253 
04:15 T3 0.1016  12:15 T2 0.1765  20:15 T1 0.2253 
04:30 T3 0.1016  12:30 T2 0.1765  20:30 T1 0.2253 
04:45 T3 0.1016  12:45 T2 0.1765  20:45 T1 0.2253 
05:00 T3 0.1016  13:00 T2 0.1765  21:00 T1 0.2253 
05:15 T3 0.1016  13:15 T2 0.1765  21:15 T2 0.1765 
05:30 T3 0.1016  13:30 T2 0.1765  21:30 T2 0.1765 
05:45 T3 0.1016  13:45 T2 0.1765  21:45 T2 0.1765 
06:00 T3 0.1016  14:00 T2 0.1765  22:00 T2 0.1765 
06:15 T3 0.1016  14:15 T2 0.1765  22:15 T2 0.1765 
06:30 T3 0.1016  14:30 T2 0.1765  22:30 T2 0.1765 
06:45 T3 0.1016  14:45 T2 0.1765  22:45 T2 0.1765 
07:00 T3 0.1016  15:00 T2 0.1765  23:00 T2 0.1765 
07:15 T2 0.1765  15:15 T2 0.1765  23:15 T2 0.1765 
07:30 T2 0.1765  15:30 T2 0.1765  23:30 T2 0.1765 
07:45 T2 0.1765  15:45 T2 0.1765  23:45 T2 0.1765 
08:00 T2 0.1765  16:00 T2 0.1765  24:00 T2 0.1765 
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5.2 SIMULATION OF A CONTRACT CHANGE 
In this chapter it will be analyzed a possible double/triple-tariffs contract that an end-user could 
sign abandoning his mono tariff one. Tariffs’ values and schedules are taken from “EDP25” and 
Portuguese Regulator of energetic systems ”ERSE”26 respectively. 
 
Table 5-11: Mono-tariff, bi-tariff, three tariff contracts 
Monotariff [€/kWh] Bi-tariff [e/kWh] Three-tariff [€/kWh] 
0.1544 ”Vazio” 0.187 ”Fora Vazio” 0.2735 ”Ponta” 
 0.110 ”Vazio” 0.1571 ”Cheias” 
  0.1038 ”Vazio” 
 
Table 5-12: Schedule for a three-tariff contract (Summertime) 
Monday-Friday Saturday Sunday 
”Vazio” ”Vazio” ”Vazio” 
00.00-07.00h 00.00-09.30h / 13.00-18.30h / 
22.00-24.00h 
All day 
for 24h 
”Cheias” ”Cheias”  
07.00-09.30h / 12.00-18.30h / 
21.00-24.00h 
09.30-13.00h / 
18.30-22.00h 
 
”Ponta”   
09.30-12.00h / 
18.30-21.00h 
  
 
Table 5-13: Schedule for a double tariff contract (Summer schedule) 
Monday-Friday Saturday Sunday 
”Vazio” ”Vazio” ”Vazio” 
00.00-07.00h 00.00-09.30h / 13.00-18.30h / 
22.00-24.00h 
All day 
for 24h 
”Fora de vazio” ”Fora de vazio”  
 
07.00-24.00h 
09.30-13.00h / 
18.30-22.00h 
 
It’s not necessary to show the schedule of the 1T contract since the same price is applied all 
over the 24h for each day of the week: there are not distinctions between peak and valley hours 
then. That’s why an obsolete mono-tariff contract type that doesn’t allow end-users to drive 
consumptions into more economic periods is not advantageous for the user and, at the same 
 
25Portuguese Energy Producer: https://www.edp.pt/particulares/energia/tarifarios/ 
26(Entitade Reguladora Dos Servicos Energeticos) 
http://www.erse.pt/pt/electricidade/tarifaseprecos/periodoshorarios/Paginas/CiclodiariofornecBTEBTNPt.aspx 
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time, represents a serious challenge for the DNO to manage peak-power consumptions. 
Now the used method will be explained (Fig.5.11 sums the algorithm adopted). 
Figure 5-10: EDP tariffs for 3 users depending on the signed contract 
Figure 5-11: Scheme to evaluate Qfin and costs of the peak shaving 
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First step: Users classification 
The data the author used are relative to power absorption of the Portuguese grid all over the 
365 days of the year, divided in 96 values per each day (one every 15 minutes along the 24h). 
Moreover, since EDP differentiates users according to their contracted power, 3 cases have 
been explored: 20.7 [kVA], 17.25 [kVA] and 6.9 [kVA] that have been classified as BTN-A, 
BTN-B and BTN-C user type respectively. 
In order to determine the exact amount of power absorbed by each consumer, 96 coefficients 
are given: they are supposed to be applied to every power measurement (i.e. every 15 minutes) 
all over the all year. Since the overall power is a few Gigawatt as order of magnitude, these 
coefficients range between 0.02 to 0.05, more or less. They change every 15 minutes and from 
user to user because their role is to adapt the overall consumption curve to its specific consumer. 
Tab. 5.14 shows the amount of money that every operator has to pay every 15 minutes: it is 
given by the tariff (of the mono-tariff contract type in this case) multiplied by the absorbed 
power and by 0.25 (it represents 15 minutes in the decimal unit system as it will be better 
explained later). 
The same procedure will be adopted for the double-tariff case and the triple one, since only the 
input values change. 
 
Second step: Days distinction 
Three days have been considered and each one has been analyzed by every user’s point of view. 
The selected days are Monday, Saturday and Sunday of the first week of July. Monday has been 
chosen as a representation of a typical weekday in which triple tariff schedule can be applied; 
Saturday and Sunday were instead mandatory since they have their own tariffs schedule. 
 
Third step: Tariffs definition 
The “triple tariff” schedule has been already presented in Tab.5.12 (pag.51): it can be noticed 
that from Monday to Friday 3 different prices along the 24h are scheduled, whilst on Saturday 
and Sunday only 2 and 1 prices, respectively. Their values are shown in Fig. 5.10 (pag.52), 
where contracted powers are written in place of BTN-A, BTN-B, BTN-C. 
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Fourth step: Tariffs application 
Prices have been applied over the 3 different days for all consumers. Study took into 
consideration one day at a time, therefore the mono-double-triple tariffs have been applied to 
the three users on Monday, Saturday and Sunday. Tables 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18 represent this step. 
 
Fifth step: Definition of Qfin for each case 
Since the goal of the study is to determine whether a new contract allows to save money 
managing consumptions over the day, it’s mandatory to evaluate Qfin. As previously written, 
and here reported, Qfin is given by the equation 5.7. 
Table 5-14: Night mono-tariff table with imports for each user every 15 minutes  
 
Table 5-15: Night mono-tariff table with imports for each user every 15 minutes (they keep constant 
over the day) 
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𝑄𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 ∗
𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑛 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝑖𝑛
+ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 
(5.7) 
Its evaluation, computed for each user every 15 minutes, is necessary to determine how 
elasticity affects consumptions during the day. In fact, three scenarios have been considered: 
• Participate to DR program over the hole day (moving energy from “peaks” to “valleys”); 
• Participate to DR program only in peak hours (only reducing loads during “peaks”); 
• Switching to a 2T/3T contract without participating DR (just to make a comparison); 
Elasticity was selected to be a parameter in order to see the effects of its variation. ∆P is given 
by Pfin-Pin, where Pfin is the tariff of the double/triple contract in that specific 15 minutes and 
Pin the tariff of the single tariff contract. Initial power Qin is the power before participate DR 
program. 
Sixth step: Comparison with mono-tariff case 
In order to check how much elasticity worked27, a comparison with situation before DR has to 
be done. That allows to check how much power has been moved from peak hours to valley 
hours, calculating the total cost of the operation. 
 
Seventh step: Evaluating of the expenses for each case 
Costs of the hole day are then computed, simply applying the tariff to the corresponding power 
value. Expenses are compared considering every one of the three scenarios presented above.  
Finally, conclusions are made.  
 
27 Since e<0, during positive ∆P a power cut will occur (i.e. in the peak hours), while during negative ∆P periods 
an increment of production is expected to happen (”valley hours”). 
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APPLICATION ON MONDAY 
Here it will be presented a study case that consider Monday as example day since all three 
tariffs of a triple-tariff contract can be applied during it. 
Firstly, the mono-tariff contract has been applied in order to be able to compare whether a 
mono-tariff contract is more convenient than a double/triple tariff one. The three users 
classification has been adopted for every day in every contract, as previously mentioned. In 
table 5.19, 3 tariffs are reported (one per consumer: each one remains constant along the 24h 
since it’s a mono-tariff contract). Expenses are shown too, evaluated multiplying the tariff by 
the corresponding power consumption (3 columns on the right). 
It might be helpful to remind that tariff is expressed as [€/kWh] while power consumption as 
[MW], therefore a conversion into energy units is required: that is satisfied by using a 0.25 
factor (since it expresses 15 minutes into decimal units) into the ”tariff x power” multiplication. 
Here are now reported the overall prices related to consumes calculated with mono, double and 
triple tariff contract. In these last 2 cases, DR is not applied yet therefore consumptions are not 
moved from high tariff periods to low tariffs. Tables 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18 report money values. 
Table 5-16: Total money paid over the day - mono tariff 
BTN-A user BTN-B user BTN-C user 
423,602.2915 € 547,889.727 € 675,578.651 € 
 
Table 5-17:Total money paid over the day - double tariff (no DR) 
BTN-A user BTN-B user BTN-C user 
458,749.5776 € 596,285.1746 € 753,520.1255 € 
 
Table 5-18: Total money paid over the day - triple tariff (no DR) 
BTN-A user BTN-B user BTN-C user 
468,236.5816 € 608,195.1568 € 782,638.5917 € 
 
Firstly, the double tariff contract (“2T”) will be presented. In table 5.19 the two tariffs along 
the day are separated by different colors (blue for ”Vazio” and pink for ”Fora de Vazio” 
periods). Please note that 2 different tariffs are present for each kind of consumer but they’re 
not the same (as can be seen in the grey stripe of Fig.5.10, in page 52). The overall expense is 
reported in Table 5.17: values are bigger than 1T case since DR program is not applied yet. 
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The same consideration can be done about Tab.5.20, where a triple tariff contract (”3T”) 
schedule is shown. The three tariffs periods are distinguishable thanks to the colors: blue for 
”Vazio” (not reported in this template), pink for ”Cheias”, orange for ”Ponta”. Even now tariffs 
schedule over the 24h is common to all users while the amounts are different. Moreover, total 
expense is reported in Tab.5.18 and again values are bigger than 1T case since DR program is 
not applied yet. 
 
Table 5-19: First 8 hours of double tariff schedule for each user every 15 minutes (afternoon and night 
hours have been not reported since they are constant from 07:15 on) 
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Trends of expenses along the 24h are displayed in graphs 5.12 and 5.13. They only show values 
relative to the BTN-A user type; since trends are equal to the other consumers’, only graphs 
related to this user will be considered. Both graphs present two y-axes: on the left y-axis the 
overall money are meant to be read while on the right one the 3 different tariffs over the 24h 
Figure 5-12: Monday expense trend of mono and bi tariff contracts 
Table 5-20: Last 8 hours of triple tariff schedule every 15 minutes (morning and afternoon hours have 
been not reported) 
 
Table 5-21: Last 8 hours of triple tariff schedule every 15 minutes (morning and afternoon hours have 
been not reported) 
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(0.2730 €/kWh, 0.1658 €/kWh and 0.1036 €/kWh). In order to avoid confusion, “areas” were 
chosen for tariffs while ”lines” for trends. Therefore orange, blue and green areas represent 
mono, double and triple tariffs respectively while red, blue and green curves represent expense 
for mono, double and triple tariff contracts. 
In Tab.5.23 Qfin evaluations are reported. All the ”∆P” are calculated, considering a switching 
from a mono to a double tariff contract and from a mono to a triple tariff contract, for every 
user (Tab.5.22 shows ΔP values for both cases differentiating hours of the day). These values 
have been inserted into the equation 5.7 to evaluate every Qfin, reported in Tab.5.23, where the 
grey back-ground is used to distinguish “peak hours” from other periods according to the 3T 
contract (triple-tariff). 
 
Table 5-22: Evolution of ∆P [€/kWh] over the 24h for every consumer. 
∆P: From a Mono-tariff to a Bi-tariff contract 
User 00:00-07:00 07:15-09:30 09:45-12:00 12:15-18:30 18:45-21:00 21:15-24:00 
BTN-A -0.0472 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
BTN-B -0.0464 0.0306 0.0306 0.0306 0.0306 0.0306 
BTN-C -0.0444 0.0326 0.0326 0.0326 0.0326 0.0326 
∆P: From a Mono-tariff to a Tri-tariff contract 
User 00:00-07:00 07:15-09:30 09:45-12:00 12:15-18:30 18:45-21:00 21:15-24:00 
BTN-A -0.0544 -0.0012 0.115 -0.0012 0.115 -0.0012 
BTN-B -0.0536 -0.0005 0.1156 -0.0005 0.1156 -0.005 
BTN-C -0.0506 0.0027 0.1191 0.0027 0.1191 0.0027 
Figure 5-13: Monday expense trend of mono and tri-tariff contracts 
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Table 5-23: Qfin evaluation every 15 minutes for every consumer (afternoon hours are not reported) 
 
Figure 5-14: Monday expense trend of mono and tri-tariff contractsTable 5-24: Qfin evaluation every 15 
minutes for every consumer (afternoon hours are not reported) 
61  
Tab.5.23 shows Qfin values for the three users, considering for each one of them a contract 
evolution from mono to double tariff and from mono to triple tariffs. Grey background is used 
to detect “peak hours” according to the 3T contract: as explained earlier, this schedule has been 
applied also to the 2T contract since power peaks occurred in the same periods. 
At this point two ways of participating DR are possible: the first one is to move the saved energy 
during peaks into valleys (i.e. participating DR keeping constant daily energy constant); the 
second one instead is to reduce load during peak hours without using that energy in the night. 
DR applied over the 24h 
Table 5.25 shows the difference of energy saved during peaks minus the energy used during 
valleys considering different elasticity values: negative values mean that night consumption 
(that correspond to valley energy time) overcompensates energy saved during the day. Being 
the tariffs very different in these two periods, it can be seen as a reasonable choice. Positive 
prices instead are a consequence of the fact that saved power in “peaks” is more than the used 
power in the nights. A consideration has to be done: 2T schedule doesn’t present the same 
“peaks-periods” as the 3T since it has only 2 tariffs (daily and nocturnal one). Despite that, 
peaks periods of 3T contract have been applied to the 2T because data showed an increment of 
consumption, therefore it was necessary to move energy from that specific interval into another. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn: 
• Participating DR in a 2T contract allows to compensate almost totally the consumption 
decrease with its increase: a few MWh may be “over saved” or “overproduced”, that is 
a small percentage over the 5-6 GWh used along the day. On the other side, with 3T 
contract the amount of energy saved is much more than the one used in the night, 
resulting in a consistent money saving for the consumer. 
• As last row of Tab.5.25 shows, a small elasticity results in a more balanced management 
of energy: that is because small values of e make the user cut less power during the day, 
therefore there’s less amount of energy to shift into night period. This is particularly 
true for the 2T contract, while it’s not so for 3T one. The reason is given by the (5.8): 
huge ∆Ps compensate the effect that e has on Qfin. 
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Table 5-25: ∆Energy for every new contract for each user 
 BTN-A [MWh] BTN-B [MWh] BTN-C [MWh] 
e 1T→2T 1T→3T 1T→2T 1T→3T 1T→2T 1T→3T 
-0.35 -4.499 102.236 -2.5128 136.413 23.468 228.413 
-0.36 -4.628 105.565 -2.5846 140.311 24.138 234.939 
-0.40 -5.142 117.294 -2.8717 155.901 26.821 261.044 
-0.50 -6.428 146.618 -3.5897 194.876 33.525 326.305 
-0.20 -2.571 58.647 -1.4359 77.950 13.411 130.522 
𝑄𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 ∗
𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑛 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝑖𝑛
+ 𝑄𝑖𝑛 
(5.8) 
Tables 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18 showed the expenses paid by each user in every contract type. 
DR only in high tariff periods 
Whether a consumer has as priority money savings, an option can be represented by cutting his 
load during the high-tariffs periods without moving energy into nighttime. This results in a “loss 
of comfort” [10] since less energy is used in the all day. 
This scenario has been computed by evaluating the difference of power absorption caused by 
new remunerations, resulting in the following expenses values28: 
Table 5-26: Expenses for every new contract for each user type 
 BTN-A [k€] BTN-B [k€] BTN-C [k€] 
DR nature 1T→2T 1T→3T 1T→2T 1T→3T 1T→2T 1T→3T 
Only load cut 432.582 420.921 561.351 546.329 707.546 691.565 
Energy shift 439.378 428.833 570.018 556.014 716.908 701.569 
No DR at all 458.749 468.237 596.285 608.195 753.520 782.639 
Compared 
to 
1T contract 
 
1T 
 
1T 
 
1T 
 
1T 
 
1T 
 
1T 
No DR at all 423.602 423.602 547.889 547.889 675.579 675.579 
Table 5.26 presents a summary of the amount of money for each study case: the less expensive, 
as expected, is the scenario with only power cut that result advantageous only by switching to 
a 3T contract (as can be seen comparing values with the last row, that is the starting contract 
situation used as reference). Moreover, that scenario is the only one for which is better to switch 
from a 1T contract to a 3T one: for all other cases the mono-tariff contract remains the best 
 
28 The “Energy shift” scenario (4th row) is the one previously explained. It has been reported in order to do an 
easier comparison. 
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choice from a consumer point of view. That leads to an important clarification: Demand 
Response programs are defined from DNO operators in order for them to avoid lines 
congestions. Tariffs schedule are an incentive that make consumers move production away 
from peak demand hours. Remuneration and other aspects are consequences that consumer  (or 
the overall electric system) can benefit from, but it’s not the priority of a grid operator.  
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5.3 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presented the study conducted in 5 months of work.  
First, some analytical ways described how to get elasticity from power-remunerations plots. 
Since those graphs are available and easy to get, it represents a useful and easy-to-apply tool. 
Then, a DR scenario invented by the author has been presented and applied on real data, in 
order to have a reliable comparison. Besides real-time elasticity values, a model based on their 
interpolation has been studied. In fact, the goal was to get an equation that allows the DNO to 
predict with very good precision how much power is going to be actually delivered on a specific 
day, since this amount could change from the contracted one due to particular conditions, 
weather in primis. Its reliability had been proved thanks to MAPE index, with good results. In 
fact, money waste due to wrong estimations has been computed, bringing encouraging results 
(only a little percentage of the total money would have been wasted). Then, a small comparison 
with a fixed elasticity value has been done in terms of power, showing that a more recent and 
flexible one is way more reliable.  
In the third step, a little observation about DR on weekends has been done: if on Saturday it 
doesn’t make a lot of sense moving huge blocks of power from days to nights (and it would 
bother the consumers since on weekends they may have different needs than during the week), 
on Sundays it’s not possible to apply DR at all giving the actual contracts, because only one 
tariff is scheduled and no ∆P are then possible to compute. 
In the next section it was done a simulation of a contract change. It may be mandatory indeed, 
both for a DNO and for a user, to be able to switch consumptions from specific hours (peak 
tariff hours) into others, resulting in less grid congestions, more stability, and less prices for the 
consumer to pay. For that reason 2 types of contracts have been discussed, a double and a triple 
tariff one. Only in this last case and under particular circumstances (no “energy moving”, i.e. 
consuming less energy over the 24h without keeping it constant), it is convenient for a consumer 
to switch to a 3T contract. This brought to a final conclusion relative to DR: it is a program 
used by DNO to better manage power fluxes and, only as a secondary purpose, it can be used 
by final users to pay less bills.  
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6 Conclusions 
This work started with the introduction to Demand Response, presenting it as a future mean to 
manage energy fluxes in a smart grid context. Since it requires efforts and knowledge from 
different fields (engineering, economic, juridical, environmental, social), lot of researchers have 
been involved in this particular program and lot of developments are still needed. Demand 
Response represents a tool that can be applied in any kind of context all over the world: that’s 
why researchers from India, China, USA, Europe and other important zones are financially 
supported to find out new smart and efficient ways to introduce it into their electric system, 
whatever it is. In fact, it doesn’t matter whether energy is produced by traditional power plants 
with a small penetration of RES, or if RES influence is very strong: power management will be 
always considered as an opportunity to optimize production, transmission and utilization costs. 
Obviously environmental issues have to be considered too, and fortunately target as “2020 
climate and energy package” and long-term goal such as the “2050 Energy Roadmap” are 
driving technological progress into that direction. 
Unfortunately economic benefits are often considered stronger motivations than 
environmental/technical ones, therefore a quick overview about different type of electric 
markets has been made. Focusing on this point, it must be reminded that DR is not supposed to 
be a way to earn money easily: its priority is indeed to move blocks of energy into different 
periods of the day to maintain grids constantly balanced. A contract switch was simulated to 
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monitor these power fluxes changes due to tariff schedules. Analysis of economic consequences 
for 3 consumers types have been reported, showing that changing from a mono-tariff contract 
to a double/triple one is indeed never convenient. Participants of this program are in fact being 
paid, according to their actual contribution or on decided terms, but usually these amount of 
money results in a small-medium discount on the final bill. It’s important to remember indeed 
that the goal is an economic optimization of the overall system, not only for consumers’ point 
of view,  in fact also production and transmission costs are included in the objective function 
to minimize. Economic impacts of different possible scenarios were presented for this reason, 
in fact the only grid stability is not the only criteria to choose a method over the others.  
Consumers will bring to another topic that has been quickly mentioned: social knowledge and 
acceptance. Two options are indeed possible in order to move huge blocks of energy: a small 
number of big consumers or a big amount of little ones. Informing people about how DR works, 
how obtain benefits in terms of pollution and grid balance must be seen as a strong challenge 
since population may be reluctant towards a technology that (apparently) doesn’t improve lives 
and is not so economically valid. In order to make it socially applicable, this work considered 
DR scenarios with constraints that may be accepted by the population: load cut only if 
consumptions exceed high power caps in particular periods and keeping the same amount of 
energy in the 24h are some of them. These constraints are chosen by the author and they are 
freely adjustable: for example parameters as elasticity, when it was used as an input value, was 
selected within a reasonable range.  
In this particular case, i.e. when elasticity was used as an input value, literature and papers have 
been consulted in order to fix a proper range from which select a reasonable elasticity value. 
As already mentioned, most of them were referring to study cases before 2010, so that values 
may have changed considerably during the last years: this is the reason why new methods to 
get updated and more accurate values have been analyzed.  
This report brought to a result that can have practical applications, that is the estimation of 
elasticity considering his change during the day and the weekends. Not only, also a way to 
obtain it from specific graphs was demonstrated. It is author’s hope that these results will give 
some help in defining new updated elasticity values differentiating it for users classes. 
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Resulting papers 
Working on this report has given the chance to write some papers signed by the author himself 
and his supervisors, prof. Zita Vale and prof. Pedro Faria of “ISEP – Instituto Superior de 
Engenharia do Porto”. Those papers are going to be presented in conferences involving Demand 
Response topic. 
Pierfrancesco Corsi, Pedro Faria, Zita Vale. “ Elasticity Parameter Definition and Analysis for Real-
Time Pricing Remuneration Basing on Different Users Cases” [Published in SEST 2019 conference and 
available on IEEE Xplore Digital Library] 
 
Pierfrancesco Corsi, João Spínola, Pedro Faria, Zita Vale. “ Study case of price elasticity’s predictability 
for BTE user type” [Published in DREAM GO 2019 conference] 
 
Pierfrancesco Corsi, Pedro Faria, Zita Vale. “Effects of elasticity parameter definition for real-time 
pricing remuneration considering different user types” [Published in ICEER 2019 conference and in 
press for the “Energy Reports Journal”] 
 
Pierfrancesco Corsi, Pedro Faria, Zita Vale. “Online Estimation and Use of Price Elasticity of Demand 
for Shifting Loads Through Real-Time Pricing” [Submitted for PSCC 2020 – Power System 
Computation Conference] 
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Attached Documentation 
Table: 24h power values: tariffs are in [€/kWh], real power is in [MW],  “cap power” stands for power after DR. 
Hour  Value [MW] Cap Power Hour  Value [MW] Cap Power 
00:15 T3 0.1016 5202.58606 5202.58606 12:15 T2 0.1765 5009.06685 5009.06685 
00:30 T3 0.1016 5193.60081 5193.60081 12:30 T2 0.1765 5029.58376 5029.58376 
00:45 T3 0.1016 5180.70770 5180.70770 12:45 T2 0.1765 5081.82233 5081.82233 
01:00 T3 0.1016 5166.13504 5166.13504 13:00 T2 0.1765 5068.42056 5068.42056 
01:15 T3 0.1016 5082.65782 5082.65782 13:15 T2 0.1765 4994.83332 4994.83332 
01:30 T3 0.1016 5048.00384 5048.00384 13:30 T2 0.1765 4955.84441 4955.84441 
01:45 T3 0.1016 4945.79368 4945.79368 13:45 T2 0.1765 4836.66468 4836.66468 
02:00 T3 0.1016 4908.93272 4908.93272 14:00 T2 0.1765 4802.71828 4802.71828 
02:15 T3 0.1016 4752.54123 4752.54123 14:15 T2 0.1765 4717.48842 4717.48842 
02:30 T3 0.1016 4716.78384 4716.78384 14:30 T2 0.1765 4703.69406 4703.69406 
02:45 T3 0.1016 4572.30371 4572.30371 14:45 T2 0.1765 4652.34444 4652.34444 
03:00 T3 0.1016 4534.61148 4534.61148 15:00 T2 0.1765 4648.07156 4648.07156 
03:15 T3 0.1016 4410.04946 4410.04946 15:15 T2 0.1765 4653.91729 4653.91729 
03:30 T3 0.1016 4378.47006 4378.47006 15:30 T2 0.1765 4647.44505 4647.44505 
03:45 T3 0.1016 4274.19825 4274.19825 15:45 T2 0.1765 4635.15869 4635.15869 
04:00 T3 0.1016 4247.74090 4247.74090 16:00 T2 0.1765 4638.14150 4638.14150 
04:15 T3 0.1016 4156.34987 4156.34987 16:15 T2 0.1765 4647.47854 4647.47854 
04:30 T3 0.1016 4136.11115 4136.11115 16:30 T2 0.1765 4652.97034 4652.97034 
04:45 T3 0.1016 4079.55884 4079.55884 16:45 T2 0.1765 4682.78988 4682.78988 
05:00 T3 0.1016 4061.98542 4061.98542 17:00 T2 0.1765 4710.73546 4710.73546 
05:15 T3 0.1016 4006.12926 4006.12926 17:15 T2 0.1765 4858.15325 4858.15325 
05:30 T3 0.1016 3994.97722 3994.97722 17:30 T2 0.1765 4955.36892 4955.36892 
05:45 T3 0.1016 3965.93220 3965.93220 17:45 T2 0.1765 5366.79767 5366.79767 
06:00 T3 0.1016 3955.45336 3955.45336 18:00 T2 0.1765 5484.61118 5484.61118 
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06:15 T3 0.1016 3940.14699 3940.14699 18:15 T2 0.1765 5788.55214 5565.23290 
06:30 T3 0.1016 3932.09580 3932.09580 18:30 T2 0.1765 5818.79016 5565.23290 
06:45 T3 0.1016 3925.61018 3925.61018 18:45 T1 0.2253 5914.51145 5565.23290 
07:00 T3 0.1016 3917.76245 3917.76245 19:00 T1 0.2253 5922.38692 5565.23290 
07:15 T2 0.1765 3916.02061 3916.02061 19:15 T1 0.2253 5997.65854 5565.23290 
07:30 T2 0.1765 3894.54622 3894.54622 19:30 T1 0.2253 6012.70322 5565.23290 
07:45 T2 0.1765 3844.81441 3844.81441 19:45 T1 0.2253 6054.60038 5565.23290 
08:00 T2 0.1765 3788.03257 3788.03257 20:00 T1 0.2253 6057.08581 5565.23290 
08:15 T2 0.1765 3682.70551 3682.70551 20:15 T1 0.2253 6102.36341 5565.23290 
08:30 T2 0.1765 3691.93271 3691.93271 20:30 T1 0.2253 6111.90504 5565.23290 
08:45 T2 0.1765 3672.15857 3672.15857 20:45 T1 0.2253 6126.11484 5565.23290 
09:00 T2 0.1765 3696.87917 3696.87917 21:00 T1 0.2253 6107.75866 5565.23290 
09:15 T2 0.1765 3786.75734 3786.75734 21:15 T2 0.1765 6076.37282 5565.23290 
09:30 T2 0.1765 3825.03806 3825.03806 21:30 T2 0.1765 6065.70908 5565.23290 
09:45 T1 0.2253 3945.62828 3945.62828 21:45 T2 0.1765 6020.13602 5565.23290 
10:00 T1 0.2253 3991.60330 3991.60330 22:00 T2 0.1765 6005.17943 5565.23290 
10:15 T1 0.2253 4132.95383 4132.95383 22:15 T2 0.1765 5948.87470 5565.23290 
10:30 T1 0.2253 4187.56947 4187.56947 22:30 T2 0.1765 5929.95846 5565.23290 
10:45 T1 0.2253 4383.97559 4383.97559 22:45 T2 0.1765 5834.13628 5565.23290 
11:00 T1 0.2253 4436.32023 4436.32023 23:00 T2 0.1765 5799.53615 5565.23290 
11:15 T1 0.2253 4614.47933 4614.47933 23:15 T2 0.1765 5627.86613 5565.23290 
11:30 T1 0.2253 4675.03644 4675.03644 23:30 T2 0.1765 5569.51036 5565.23290 
11:45 T1 0.2253 4848.26761 4848.26761 23:45 T2 0.1765 5354.96056 5354.96056 
12:00 T1 0.2253 4886.67032 4886.67032 24:00 T2 0.1765 5306.55398 5306.55398 
 
